God Is My Roommate? Tax Exemptions for Parsonages Yesterday, Today, and (if Constitutional) Tomorrow by Brunson, Samuel D.
Indiana Law Journal 
Volume 96 Issue 2 Article 5 
Spring 2021 
God Is My Roommate? Tax Exemptions for Parsonages Yesterday, 
Today, and (if Constitutional) Tomorrow 
Samuel D. Brunson 
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law, sbrunson@luc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, Housing Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate 
Commons, Religion Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brunson, Samuel D. (2021) "God Is My Roommate? Tax Exemptions for Parsonages Yesterday, Today, and 
(if Constitutional) Tomorrow," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 96 : Iss. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol96/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law 
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ 
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact 
rvaughan@indiana.edu. 
 
God Is My Roommate? Tax Exemptions for Parsonages 
Yesterday, Today, and (if Constitutional) Tomorrow 
SAMUEL D. BRUNSON* 
In 2019, the Seventh Circuit decided an Establishment Clause question that had 
been percolating through the courts for two decades. It held that the parsonage 
allowance, which permits “ministers of the gospel” to receive an untaxed housing 
allowance, does not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. It grounded 
its conclusion in part on the “historical significance” test the Supreme Court 
established in its Town of Greece v. Galloway decision.  
In coming to that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit cited a 200-year unbroken 
history of property tax exemptions for religious property. According to the Seventh 
Circuit, that history demonstrated that both the Founders and subsequent 
generations of Americans recognized that there was no constitutional problem with 
exempting parsonages.  
The court’s historical significance analysis was fundamentally flawed, 
however. Had the court actually engaged with this history, rather than made the 
conclusory assertion of consistent and uncontroversial exemption, it would have seen 
at least two things that complicated its facile conclusion. Significantly, in treating 
the history of religious property tax exemptions as unbroken and consistent, the court 
elided the actual history, which was messy and varied. The actual history provides 
no support for the proposition that the Framers and those who followed viewed 
property tax exemptions as constitutional.  
Even if the history were as clean as the Seventh Circuit portrayed it, that 
history would have been irrelevant to the question of the constitutionality of the 
parsonage allowance. The Supreme Court did not incorporate the Establishment 
Clause against the states until 1947, so states faced no Establishment Clause bar 
to exempting for religious property. And the federal government only made four 
attempts at taxing property, none of which expressly exempted religious property.  
In this Article, I explore the historical and current tax exemptions for parsonages, 
and trace how states arrived at their current exemptions. Ultimately, I conclude that 
the historical significance test, as applied by the Seventh Circuit, does not support 
the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance. I further conclude that, given its 
complexity and the fact that attorneys and judges tend to be poor historians, the 
historical significance test is not well suited as a jurisprudential tool for analyzing 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The Fourth Presbyterian Church in Chicago bought a $975,000 condominium for 
its head pastor in 2018.1 While expensive, that parsonage2 provides both the church 
and the pastor with substantial benefits. With employer-provided housing, the pastor 
does not need to pay for housing, and can instead spend her salary on other things, 
including food, housing, and even recreation. Meanwhile, the church can pay its 
pastor a lower salary because the pastor incurs lower expenses. In fact, as the Fourth 
Presbyterian Church considered acquiring the parsonage, its senior pastor agreed to 
a reduction in her cash compensation.3 
 
 
 1. Bob Goldsborough, Fourth Presbyterian Church Pays $975,000 for Gold Coast 
Condo, CHIC. TRIB., (Aug. 1, 2018, 8:20 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/real-estate 
/elite-street/ct-re-elite-street-fourth-presbyterian-church-20180731-story.html [https://perma 
.cc/ZRL7-HXZK]. 
 2. Broadly speaking, a “parsonage” is “the residence of any minister of religion.” 
Parsonage, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005). Because section 107 of the Internal 
Revenue Code is titled “Rental value of parsonages,” however, I will use “parsonage” more 
broadly, meaning any housing provided to clergy. I.R.C. § 107 (2018). While section 107 only 
excludes housing provided to a “minister of the gospel,” the IRS reads “minister of the gospel” 
to include non-Christians whose duties “constitute the conduct of religious worship or the 
ministration of sacerdotal functions.” Rev. Rul. 58-221, 1958-1 C.B. 53. 
 3. Senior Pastor Housing Proposal: Synopsis, FOURTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (Apr. 12, 
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This parsonage also provides the church and the pastor with less-obvious tax 
benefits. For instance, as long as the Fourth Presbyterian Church requires its head 
pastor to live in the parsonage as a condition of her employment, it will not have to 
pay Illinois property tax on the parsonage. And while employer-provided housing 
represents a benefit to an employee, clergy do not have to include the value of 
church-provided parsonages in their gross income for income tax purposes. The 
value of the parsonage to the pastor is higher than the after-tax amount other 
taxpayers would spend on similar housing. 
While the Fourth Presbyterian Church has the resources to acquire a parsonage 
for its head pastor,4 those resources are unnecessary for clergy to receive the benefit 
of a federal income tax exemption for housing. Congress also allows clergy to receive 
a tax-free cash housing allowance, a benefit unavailable to nonclergy taxpayers 
These exclusions do not represent a policy of absolutely ignoring clergy housing for 
tax purposes: clergy have to include the value of church-provided housing and 
housing allowances in calculating their self-employment tax.5 
The tax law treats (some) religious employees better than it treats nonreligious 
employees. This better treatment at least implicates the Establishment Clause.6 The 
Freedom From Religion Foundation noticed this implication, and twice filed suit, 
arguing that the parsonage allowance violated the Establishment Clause, culminating 
in the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gaylor v. Mnuchin.7 
The court faced a significant obstacle in adjudicating this case, though: the state 
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence “is a mess—both hopelessly confused and 
deeply contradictory.”8 In spite of the chaotic state of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, the Seventh Circuit had to resolve the question of whether the 
parsonage allowance violated the Constitution. To do so, it independently applied 
two tests: “the test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman . . . and the ‘historical 
significance’ test of Town of Greece v. Galloway.”9 
Although the Gaylor court uses two tests to bolster its holding, this Article will 
focus on the historical significance test adopted by the court. I focus solely on the 
historical significance test precisely because, unlike the Lemon test, it is new and has 





 4. Because the Fourth Presbyterian Church has not posted its 2018 financial statements 
online, the public cannot know the value of its assets. It has disclosed its 2018 revenue though: 
in 2018 it brought in $8,220,652. FOURTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, 2018 IMPACT REPORT, 
https://www.fourthchurch.org/giving/impact-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z98F-PSY4]. 
 5. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-11(a) (2015). 
 6. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 448 (1994) (“[T]he idea of a broad 
privilege for religiously motivated conduct baldly contradicts the best understanding of the 
foundations of religious freedom.”). 
 7. 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1084 (W.D. Wis. 2017), rev’d, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(“This is the second time that the foundation and its officers have challenged § 107(2).”). For 
a discussion of the Freedom From Religion Foundation’s suits, see infra Section II.B. 
 8. Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006). 
 9. Gaylor, 919 F.3d 420, 426–27 (7th Cir. 2019). 
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in the test and significant difficulties courts can face in both choosing the appropriate 
history to explore and in actually evaluating that history.  
I will demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit’s application of the historical 
significance test was deeply flawed and ahistorical. The Seventh Circuit 
misrepresented the substantive history of the property tax exemption for parsonages. 
Even if it accurately portrayed the history, though, it chose the wrong history to focus 
on: property tax exemptions are not equivalent to income tax exemptions, either as a 
matter of law or as a matter of constitutional analysis.  
In its Gaylor decision, the Seventh Circuit explains that questions of 
establishment must “acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and 
has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change.”10 Under this test, if 
the practice existed at the time the First Amendment was enacted and has continued 
to be accepted, a court should hesitate to find it unconstitutional. For questions of 
income tax, applying this test is incoherent, given that the income tax did not exist at 
the time of the Framers,11 and that the provision being challenged—the exclusion of 
cash housing allowances—was not enacted until 1954.12 
Instead of analyzing the history of the parsonage allowance, the Gaylor court 
looked at “a lengthy tradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for church-
owned properties.”13 Using the property tax to analyze an income tax provision is 
problematic for a number of reasons,14 but even on its own terms, the Seventh 
Circuit’s review of the history is both facile and inaccurate. Instead of engaging the 
relevant long and complex history, the Seventh Circuit provides a cursory summary 
in a single page of its opinion. In this Article, I will discuss both the federal parsonage 
allowance and state property tax exemptions for parsonages. In that discussion, I will 
highlight the shortcomings of the Seventh Circuit’s use of the historical significance 
test, which reads the history in a motivated and instrumental manner to arrive at the 
conclusion it wants.  
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I discuss the parsonage allowance. I 
describe why and how Congress enacted it. Then, in Part II, I talk about two 
constitutional challenges that the parsonage allowance faced. Through legislation, 
Congress managed to protect the parsonage allowance from the first Establishment 
 
 
 10. Id. at 436 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014)). 
 11. The modern income tax can trace its roots back to the British income tax of 1799. 
PETER HARRIS, INCOME TAX IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS: FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1820 1 
(2006). The United States enacted its first income tax during the Civil War, STEVEN A. BANK, 
KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES 39 (Kathleen Courrier et al. eds., 
2008), but that tax expired in 1871. Samuel D. Brunson, Mormon Profit: Brigham Young, 
Tithing, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 2019 BYU L. REV. 41, 104 (2019). Congress 
made an abortive attempt to enact a federal income tax in 1894, David J. Herzig & Samuel D. 
Brunson, Let Prophets Be (Non) Profits, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1122 (2017), and 
finally enacted the modern federal income tax in 1913. BANK ET AL., supra, at 11. 
 12. See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 13. Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 436. 
 14. Among other things, the two are significantly different economically. “A major 
difference between a property tax and an income tax is that the latter taxes human capital (or 
at least returns there from) whereas the former does not (at least not directly).” HARRIS, supra 
note 11, at 386. 
2021] GOD IS MY ROOMMATE?  525 
 
Clause challenge, while, in the second, the Seventh Circuit ultimately held that the 
parsonage allowance was consistent with the Lemon test and that it met the Supreme 
Court’s historical significance test. 
Part III begins to engage with the historical significance test on a broad level. 
Rather than focus on parsonages, Part III looks at the history of religious property 
tax exemptions at the time of the Framers through the nineteenth century. The Part 
points out that the Establishment Clause is largely irrelevant to property tax 
exemptions for religious property. Notably, as the Establishment Clause was not 
incorporated against the states until 1947, this treatment is largely irrelevant to both 
the question of parsonage exemptions and to questions of religious property tax 
exemptions broadly.15 Nonetheless, because the Seventh Circuit fails to note any of 
this history, the Part will review these histories. 
Part IV provides a comprehensive look at how states treat parsonages for purposes 
of their property tax both today and in the past. Currently, some states explicitly 
exempt parsonages, some include parsonages as a subset of exempt religious 
property, and some states do not exempt parsonages. Moreover, a number of states 
that currently exempt parsonages did not exempt them in the nineteenth or early 
twentieth centuries. Part IV analyzes the states that have changed their exemption. 
All of this discussion will demonstrate that the history of property tax exemptions 
for parsonages is neither clean nor consistent and lends no support to the 
constitutionality of the parsonage allowance. Part V takes the analysis a step further, 
explaining why, even if the history was clean and consistent, it is irrelevant to the 
question of whether the parsonage allowance comports with the Establishment 
Clause. 
Part V then explains that even if this history did support the proposition that 
property tax exemptions for parsonages met the historical significance test, that lends 
no support to the parsonage allowance’s constitutionality. By looking at the property 
tax, the court chose an inapposite comparison. The differences between property tax 
exemptions and income tax exclusions differ in a constitutionally relevant manner. 
Finally, the Conclusion will evaluate what this history means, not only for the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Gaylor, but also for the utility of the historical 
significance test. Ultimately, I conclude that the Gaylor opinion’s application of the 
historical significance is a master class in misreading and misusing history. And that 
master class has significance beyond merely the analysis of the constitutionality of 
the parsonage allowance. It illustrates the difficulty in honestly evaluating a 
complicated history, and the pitfalls that attorneys and courts trying to do so face. 
I. THE PARSONAGE ALLOWANCE 
In 1913, Congress enacted the modern federal income tax.16 This new tax applied 
to taxpayers’ “entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding 
 
 
 15. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 16. JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE: TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF FDR 5 
(2013). 
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calendar year to every citizen of the United States.”17 The law defined “income” 
broadly, including any compensation for services “in whatever form paid.”18 
While this definition of income could potentially encompass virtually any type of 
transfer of value from an employer to an employee, Congress was not explicit about 
what had to be treated as income. For instance, the Revenue Act of 1913 did not 
explicitly mention employer-provided housing.19 The Treasury Department broadly 
believed that, in the abstract, such housing constituted a form of compensation and 
was thus subject to taxation.20 Still, within the first decade of the income tax, the 
Treasury Department began to cabin the reach of this broad rule.  
In 1919, the Treasury Department announced that “[b]oard and lodging furnished 
seamen in addition to their cash compensation is held to be supplied for the 
convenience of the employer and the value thereof is not required to be reported in 
such employees’ income tax returns.”21 It proceeded to formalize this test in 
regulations, providing that where an employer provided housing to its employees 
“for the convenience of the employer” rather than for compensatory purposes, 
employees could exclude the value of housing from their taxable income.22  
Almost immediately after issuing the regulation, the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
began to provide examples of housing that met the “convenience of the employer” 
test.23 For instance, employees engaged in fishing and cannery work could receive 
tax-free housing where such housing was “necessary” as a result of the “location and 
nature” of their work.24 Similarly, where hospital employees were “subject to 
immediate service on demand at any time,” and were thus required to accept housing 
from the hospital, they could exclude the value of that housing from their gross 
income.25 Employees of the Indian Service could also exempt employer-provided 
housing where the housing was provided for the convenience of the employer.26 
While the Bureau’s rulings did not represent an exclusive list of professions that 
qualified for the convenience-of-the-employer exception, it did provide that certain 
professions never qualified for tax-free housing under the convenience-of-the-
employer test. In 1921, Treasury determined that clergy was one of these disqualified 
 
 
 17. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. 114, 166. 
 18. Id. § II(B) at 167. 
 19. Adam Chodorow, The Parsonage Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 856 (2018). 
 20. See T.D. 2992, 1920-2 C.B. 76 (“[W]here a person receives as compensation for 
services rendered a salary and in addition thereto living quarters, the value to such person of 
the quarters furnished constitutes income subject to tax.”). 
 21. O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71. 
 22. T.D. 2992, 1920-2 C.B. 76. 
 23. SAMUEL D. BRUNSON, GOD AND THE IRS: ACCOMMODATING RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN 
UNITED STATES TAX LAW 80 (2018). 
 24. O.D. 814, 1921-4 C.B. 84–85. 
 25. O.D. 915, 1921-4 C.B. 84–85. 
 26. O.D. 914, 1921-4 C.B. 85. Interestingly, for Indian Service employees, the 
convenience-of-the-employer test turned on whether the housing was “charged to the 
appropriation from which the compensation of such employees is paid,” in which case they 
had to include it in their income. Id. On the other hand, if they were permitted to stay there 
“without making the right to use such quarters a part of the compensation of such employees,” 
they did not. Id. 
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professions.27 According to the Bureau ruling, if, in addition to receiving a salary, 
clergy “is permitted to use the parsonage for living quarters free of charge,” they had 
to include the fair rental value of the parsonage in income.28 
That same year, Congress overruled the Bureau of Internal Revenue.29 Congress 
did not merely enact a legislative mandate that parsonages fell within the Treasury-
created convenience-of-the-employer test. Rather, it created a new statutory category 
of exemption, allowing clergy to exclude “[t]he rental value of a dwelling house and 
appurtenances thereof furnished to a minister of the gospel as part of his 
compensation.”30 For clergy, Congress had introduced a brand-new exemption that 
allowed them to exclude housing provided for expressly compensatory purposes. 
Within two years, the Bureau received questions about the scope of the exclusion: 
Did it also exclude housing allowances paid to clergy in place of parsonages?31 The 
Bureau replied that the exclusion applied only to the in-kind provision of housing; 
clergy had to include a housing allowance in gross income “as additional 
compensation for services rendered.”32 In spite of the plain language of the parsonage 
allowance, a number of courts disagreed with the Bureau, holding that the parsonage 
allowance allowed clergy to exclude cash housing allowances from gross income.33 
The Eighth Circuit justified its conclusion, not based on the text of the statute, but 
based on its conviction that “it was not the intent nor purpose of Congress that a 
house allowance in lieu of the rental value of a dwelling house and appurtenances 
thereof furnished to a minister of the gospel should be included in his gross 
income.”34 
In 1954, Congress stepped into this debate and sided with the judiciary. Congress 
added a provision to the tax law expressly excluding “the rental allowance paid to [a 
minister of the gospel] as part of his compensation to the extent used by him to rent 
or provide a home” from gross income.35 Representative Peter Mack, Jr., who 
introduced the provision, explained that a Baptist organization had alerted him to the 
tax disparity between clergy who received in-kind housing and clergy who did not, 
a disparity that he considered discriminatory.36 
 
 
 27. BRUNSON, supra note 23, at 80. 
 28. O.D. 862, 1921-4 C.B. 85. Clergy were not the only profession barred from excluding 
housing under the convenience-of-the-employer test: Army officers could not exclude in-kind 
housing or cash housing allowances from their gross income. O.D. 921, 1921-4 C.B. 86. 
 29. Chodorow, supra note 19, at 857. 
 30. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 239 (1921). 
 31. I.T. 1694, II-1 C.B. 79 (1923).  
 32. Id.  
 33. BRUNSON, supra note 23, at 81. 
 34. Williamson v. Comm’r, 224 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1955). 
 35. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 107(2), 68A Stat. 1, 32. 
 36. BRUNSON, supra note 23, at 81. While Representative Mack stated that his primary 
goal was to end interdenominational discrimination, he also believed that benefiting clergy, 
who were “carrying on such a courageous fight” against a “godless and antireligious world 
movement,” was “not too much to do for these people who are caring for our spiritual welfare.” 
General Revenue Revision: Hearings on Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code Before the H. Comm. On Ways & Means, 83d Cong. 1574–76 
(1953) (statement of Rep. Peter F. Mack, Jr.). 
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At the same time as it expanded the parsonage allowance, Congress codified the 
Treasury Department’s convenience-of-the-employer test.37 Unlike the parsonage 
allowance, though, Congress provided no expansion in scope for this income 
exclusion. For an employee to exclude employer-provided housing from gross 
income, the employer had to provide in-kind housing, the housing had to be located 
on the business premises of and provided for the convenience of the employer, and 
the employee had to be required to accept the housing as a condition of her 
employment.38 
II. CONTROVERSY OVER THE PARSONAGE ALLOWANCE 
Until recently, the parsonage allowance has faced only a limited amount of 
constitutional controversy. Almost two decades after the expansion of the exclusion 
to ministers’ cash housing allowances, Professor David C. Johnson first noted that, 
even “[i]gnoring the constitutional problem” with the parsonage allowance, it 
seemed unfair.39 The next year, a comment in the Georgetown Law Journal not only 
argued that the parsonage allowance was unfair, but expressly argued that it violated 
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.40 
Since then, the pushback against the parsonage allowance has steadily grown. 
This pushback has not been limited solely to academics. For example, in 1984, to 
fulfill his promise to simplify the tax law, President Ronald Reagan “asked the 
Treasury Department to devise a tax reform plan.”41  As part of its plan, the Treasury 
Department proposed eliminating the parsonage allowance.42 It explained that the 
parsonage allowance violated tax policy by allowing ministers to pay less in taxes, 
while putting upward pressure on marginal tax rates.43 Moreover, it was unnecessary: 
although clergy salaries were low compared to other professions, they were not low 
“compared to taxpayers in general.”44 And the exclusion disproportionately 
benefitted wealthy clergy.45 
Still, academics have continued to contest the propriety of the parsonage 
allowance. While it would be beyond the scope of this Article to review all of the 
 
 
 37. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 119, 68A Stat. 1, 39 (1954). 
 38. Id. 
 39. David C. Johnson, Provisions of the Tax Policy Review Bill of 1972 Affecting 
Individual Taxpayers, 49 N.D. L. REV. 439, 482 (1973). The unfairness Professor Johnson 
pointed out was that ministers were not in the only profession that was undercompensated. Id. 
The justification for subsidizing their homes would have to rest on some other grounds. 
 40. Roger H. Taft, Tax Benefits for the Clergy: The Unconstitutionality of Section 107, 
62 GEO. L.J. 1261, 1271 (1974). 
 41. Matthew W. Foster, Note, The Parsonage Allowance Exclusion: Past, Present, and 
Future, 44 VAND. L. REV. 149, 162 (1991). 
 42. OFF. OF THE SEC’Y DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEP’T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT Overview 73 
(1984). 
 43. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, 
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEP’T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT vol. 2  
49 (1984). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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academic literature, I will summarize some of the commentary. In the early 1990s, 
Professor Joel Newman explained that “[s]ection 107 [the Code section excluding 
parsonages from income] has never made any sense. Legislative history is sparse and 
suggests only that Congress thought that ministers deserved a tax break.”46 He 
highlighted two problems with it. The first was its questionable constitutionality.47 
The second was its general unfairness. At religious universities, he explained, some 
faculty who fell outside of the scope of intended beneficiaries—including “members 
of the education and chemistry departments, as well as members of the religion 
department”—could qualify for tax-free parsonage allowances.48 
In the early 2000s, Professor Edward Zelinksy complicated the analysis. Under 
the Supreme Court’s Texas Monthly49 precedent, he said, the parsonage allowance 
would be unconstitutional “on the ground that section 107 narrowly subsidizes 
religion.”50 Under its Walz51 precedent, on the other hand, Professor Zelinksy 
believed that the parsonage allowance would be “constitutional as a permissible 
recognition of sectarian autonomy.”52 While he recognized the conflict and the 
argument that the parsonage allowance was unconstitutional, Professor Zelinksy 
ultimately thought that the Walz precedent—which would uphold the parsonage 
allowance—provided the better constitutional analysis.53 Still, although he believed 
that Walz provided the better analysis, he acknowledged that Texas Monthly was, at 
the time, the Supreme Court’s last word on the question of subsidizing religion.54  
A decade later, Professor Zelinsky continued to argue that the Establishment 
Clause permitted the government to exempt housing allowances paid to clergy from 
the tax base.55 By then, he had refined his argument to focus on avoiding 
entanglement between the state and religion.56 But, he argued, even if the parsonage 
allowance was permissible (though not mandatory), it represented poor tax policy: 
 
 
 46. Joel S. Newman, On Section 107’s Worst Feature: The Teacher-Preacher, 61 TAX 
NOTES 1505, 1507 (1993). 
 47. Id. (“[T]he constitutionality of the section is not entirely clear.”).  
 48. Id.  
 49. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 50. Edward A. Zelinksy, Dr. Warren, the Parsonage Exclusion, and the First Amendment, 
95 TAX NOTES 115, 118 (2002). 
 51. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 52. Zelinksy, supra note 50, at 118.  
 53. Id. at 120. 
 54. Id. Subsequent to his article, Congress made some minor changes to prevent the Ninth 
Circuit from ruling on the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance. See infra text 
accompanying notes 78–80. After those changes, Professor Zelinsky acknowledged that “the 
recent amendment of section 107(2), while intended to bolster that provision, in my judgment 
weakens both the constitutional and the tax policy arguments for that section by enmeshing 
the clergy and the IRS for future years in potentially contentious controversies about the rental 
values of the homes of taxpayer/clergymen.” Edward A. Zelinsky, Dr. Warren, Section 107, 
and Texas Monthly: A Reply, 95 TAX NOTES 1663, 1669 n.54 (2002). 
 55. Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the 
Establishment Clause? The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion and the 
Religious Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the FICA and Self-
Employment Taxes, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 144 (2012). 
 56. Id. 
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“In terms of tax policy, there is no persuasive case for Section 107(2) and its 
exclusion of cash parsonage allowances.”57 
Around the same time, Professor Ellen Aprill suggested that the parsonage 
allowance be both expanded and narrowed so that it apply not to “ministers of the 
gospel,” but to certain employees of all nonprofits who needed to be available for 
emergency calls.58 Doing so would avoid any potential Establishment Clause 
problem because clergy would make up a portion of a larger group that benefited 
rather than being the sole recipients of the benefit.59 
More recently, in the course of the Seventh Circuit litigation, the Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty argued that a tax-free housing allowance paid to clergy did not 
violate the Establishment Clause because it sent “a message of neutrality with respect 
to religion, not endorsement.”60 Becket asserted that the parsonage allowance was 
merely the extension of a series of expansions to the convenience-of-the-employer 
test.61  
Professor Adam Chodorow responded to Becket’s assertion, arguing that the 
parsonage allowance raised significant Establishment Clause concerns because it 
“singles out religious actors for a special tax benefit . . . .”62 While he acknowledged 
that Establishment Clause jurisprudence was “muddled,” he argued, contrary to 
Professor Zelinsky, that the parsonage allowance did not fit within a broad, neutral 
policy that included clergy.63 As a result, he said, Walz was inapplicable, and courts 
should find the parsonage allowance unconstitutional under Texas Monthly.64 
Despite the pushback against the parsonage allowance, no taxpayer challenged its 
constitutionality in court until the early 2000s. The author of the Georgetown Law 
Journal Comment argued that this failure to raise a constitutional challenge “can be 
credited in part to the fact that before the 1968 Supreme Court decision in Flast v. 
Cohen, a federal taxpayer qua taxpayer had no standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a federal statute.”65 Even with this taxpayer standing, though, 
 
 
 57. Id. at 133. 
 58. Ellen Aprill, Parsonage and Tax Policy: Rethinking the Exclusion, 38 EXEMPT ORG. 
TAX REV. 29, 31 (2002). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Brief of Intervening Defendants-Appellants at 53, Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 
425 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Adam Chodorow, The Parsonage Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 909 (2018). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Taft, supra note 40, at 1271. In 1923, the Supreme Court held that an individual’s 
status as a taxpayer, by itself, did not confer standing to challenge the constitutionality of a 
statute. Commonwealth of Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). Forty-five years later, 
the Court acknowledged that its holding had functioned as “an impenetrable barrier to suits 
against Acts of Congress brought by individuals who can assert only the interest of federal 
taxpayers. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968). The Court thus announced a new test under 
which an individual “sometimes has standing to challenge legislation solely as a result of her 
status as a taxpayer.” Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning 
Prohibition. Even Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 162 (2016). 
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taxpayers have a hard time challenging the constitutionality of a tax provision. The 
pathway to challenge a tax law is remarkably narrow.66  
Still, the author of the Comment predicted that the new standard enunciated in 
Flast would open the door for a constitutional challenge to the parsonage 
allowance.67 That predicted challenge materialized in 2002.68 
A. Challenge Number One: Rick Warren and Erwin Chemerinsky 
The first constitutional challenge to the parsonage allowance arose accidentally, 
the unintended consequence of a standard audit. The controversy started in the 1990s, 
when the IRS disallowed a portion of the Warrens’ parsonage allowance exclusion.69 
Richard Warren had founded the Saddleback Valley Community Church in 1980.70 
In 1992, the Warrens bought a house for $360,000.71 Between 1992 and 1995, the 
trustees of the church began to designate the full amount of Richard Warren’s 
compensation as a housing allowance, which he could exclude from his gross 
income.72 In 1996, they designated $80,000 of his $100,000 salary as a housing 
allowance.73 
The Warrens excluded from their gross income the amounts they spent on 
“mortgage, utilities, furnishings, landscaping, repairs, and maintenance and real 
property taxes and homeowner's insurance premiums,” which were less than the 
amount designated as a housing allowance.74 It was more, however, than the fair 
rental value of their home, and the IRS argued that the exclusion should be limited 
to the lesser of the amount spent on housing or the fair rental value of a minister’s 
home.75 
The Tax Court disagreed.76 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit appointed Professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky to address whether the court had authority to review the 
constitutionality of the parsonage allowance, whether it should do so, and whether 
the allowance was constitutional.77 
Before the court could review the questions it had asked, though, Congress passed 
Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002.78 Representative Ramstad, 
who introduced the legislation, explained that his legislation was meant to “stop the 
attack on the housing allowance by resolving the underlying issue in the tax court 
 
 
 66. SAMUEL D. BRUNSON, GOD AND THE IRS: ACCOMMODATING RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN 
UNITED STATES TAX LAW 93 (2018). 
 67. Taft, supra note 40, at 1271. 
 68. Warren v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 69. Warren v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 343, 344 (2000). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 345. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 345–46. 
 76. Id. at 351. 
 77. Warren v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 1119, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 78. Pub. L. No. 107-181, 116 Stat. 583 (2002). 
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case.”79 After all, he explained, the Ninth Circuit had “hijacked the case and turned 
it into a challenge of the very constitutionality of the housing allowance” with the 
aid of “a law professor who happened to believe that it was unconstitutional.”80 
Congress’s gambit worked. The law provided that, prior to 2002, clergy could 
exclude housing allowance of up to their full housing expenses.81 Going forward, 
though, the clergy could only exclude up to the fair rental value of their property.82 
Effectively, it allowed the Warrens to win their litigation, but adopted the IRS’s 
position for future years.83 Satisfied, the parties to the litigation filed a motion to 
dismiss, which the Ninth Circuit granted.84 At the same time, it denied Professor 
Chemerinsky’s motion to intervene.85 This initial constitutional challenge to the 
parsonage allowance had effectively died. 
B. Challenge Number Two: Freedom From Religion Foundation 
About a decade later, the Freedom From Religion Foundation took up Professor 
Chemerinsky’s mantle. The Freedom From Religion Foundation often functions as 
an Establishment Clause watchdog, “conducting court challenges of violations of the 
separation between church and state.”86 On September 13, 2011, The Freedom From 
Religion Foundation filed a complaint in which it asserted “that 26 U.S.C. §107, both 
on its face and as administered by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the 
Department of the Treasury ("Treasury"), violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by providing preferential 
tax benefits to ministers of the gospel.”87 In its complaint, Freedom From Religion 
Foundation argued that the parsonage allowance violated the Establishment Clause 
in three respects: first, it was intended to (and did) subsidize religion.88 Second, it 
discriminated against people who were not clergy.89 Third, its administration 
required excessive entanglement between state and church.90 
While Freedom From Religion Foundation originally challenged the 
constitutionality of the parsonage allowance’s exclusion of both in-kind housing and 
housing allowances, the district court dismissed the challenge to the exclusion of in-
kind housing on standing grounds.91 But the court held, using a “modified version of 
 
 
 79. 148 CONG. REC. H1300 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002). 
 80. Id. at H1299. 
 81. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause 
and Should Be Declared Unconstitutional, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 707, 708 (2003). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Warren v. Comm’r, 302 F.3d 1012, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 85. Id. 
 86. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., Getting Acquainted, https://ffrf.org/about/getting 
-acquainted [https://perma.cc/P49Z-7EPF]. 
 87. Complaint at 1, Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051 
(W.D. Wis. 2013), vacated and remanded, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 3:11-cv-00626). 
 88. Id. at 5. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1053 (W.D. Wis. 
2013), vacated and remanded, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Because plaintiffs have not 
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the Lemon test,”92 that permitting clergy, and only clergy, to exclude cash housing 
allowances from their gross income violated the Constitution.93 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court decision and remanded 
it to be dismissed for lack of standing.94 The court never addressed the merits of the 
case, instead finding that the plaintiffs in the case lacked standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the parsonage allowance because they had never attempted to 
claim it, and had thus never had their claim denied.95 The fact that others receive an 
allegedly unconstitutional benefit did not, of itself, create a “judicially cognizable 
injury.”96 
In a footnote, though, the Seventh Circuit provided the Freedom From Religion 
Foundation with a path forward: “to establish standing, a plaintiff must request (and 
be denied) a benefit, even if, practically speaking, the request has no chance of 
success.”97 The plaintiffs followed the court’s advice, and the Freedom From 
Religion Foundation designated a portion of the salary it paid to Gaylor and Barker 
as a housing allowance, which they included in income.98 In 2015, they filed an 
amended return for 2013 claiming the parsonage allowance.99 
And the IRS provided them with a refund.100 So two months after filing their 
amended 2013 returns, they filed an amended return for 2012, again claiming the 
parsonage allowance.101 This time, to ensure that the IRS understood that they did 
not qualify under the terms of the parsonage allowance, they pointed out on their 
amended return that “they are ‘not clergy’ and that their ‘employer is not a church,’ 
 
 
opposed defendants’ argument that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 107(1), I will grant 
defendants’ motion as to that aspect of plaintiffs’ claim.”). 
 92. Id. at 1061. 
 93. Id. at 1073. 
 94. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. The district court had elided the standing problem, finding “that plaintiffs’ alleged 
injury is clear from the face of the statute and that there is no plausible argument that the 
individual plaintiffs could qualify for an exemption as ‘ministers of the gospel,’ so it would 
serve no legitimate purpose to require plaintiffs to claim the exemption and wait for the 
inevitable denial of the claim.” Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 
1051, 1055–56 (W.D. Wis. 2013). The Seventh Circuit explained that even if requiring the 
plaintiffs to claim the parsonage allowance and have their claim rejected would not improve 
the courts’ ability to adjudicate the constitutional question, it was nonetheless a constitutional 
requirement that they take those steps. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 773 F.3d at 824–
25. 
 97. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 773 F.3d at 824 n.6. 
 98. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1085 (W.D. Wis. 2017). To be excludable, 
the housing allowance must be remuneration for “services which are ordinarily the duties of a 
minister of the gospel.” Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963). In addition, the 
employing church must designate the portion of compensation that represents a housing 
allowance as such. Id. § 1.107-1(b). While they were not clergy, Gaylor and co-plaintiff Barker 
were co-presidents of the Freedom From Religion Foundation. Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 
1085. 
 99. Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 1085. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
534 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 96:521 
 
but they believed ‘it is unfair that ministers can exclude housing while we 
cannot.’”102 This time, the IRS rejected their claim, and they again sued, arguing that 
the parsonage allowance violated the Establishment Clause.103 Again, the district 
court held the parsonage allowance unconstitutional,104 and again the government 
appealed.105 
This time, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs had established an injury-
in-fact and had standing to sue.106 As such, the court had to address the substance of 
the complaint, albeit against an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that was 
“famously chaotic.”107 When questions of religious establishment come up, “the 
Court cannot even settle on one standard to apply in all Establishment Clause 
cases.”108 
Recognizing that the chaotic mess of Establishment Clause jurisprudence offered 
little guidance as to what standard to apply, the Seventh Circuit decided to evaluate 
the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance using two standards: the Lemon test 
and the “‘historical significance’ test of Town of Greece v. Galloway.”109 The 
Seventh Circuit decided that, under either test, the parsonage allowance was not 
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause, and upheld its constitutionality.110 
The Gaylor court’s analysis under the historical significance test failed to engage 
the complicated history of tax exemptions for churches and parsonages. It looked 
instead at an imagined history and engaged that imagined history only at a surface 
level.111 To the extent that the historical significance test may become one of the 
(many) Establishment Clause tests, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion provides a poor 
model for future opinions. Through the rest of this Article, I will proceed to 
illuminate the complicated and inconsistent history of tax exemptions for churches 
and parsonages. In doing so, I will describe the analysis in which a court should 
engage if it wants to employ the historical significance test properly. 
 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1086. 
 104. Id. at 1104. 
 105. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 425 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 106. Id. at 426. 
 107. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the 
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 343, 348 (2014). 
 108. Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006). 
 109. Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 426–27. 
 110. Id. at 435–36 (“Section 107(2), then, does not violated the Establishment Clause under 
the Lemon test. . . . [W]e conclude § 107(2) does not violate the Establishment Clause under 
the historical significance test.”). 
 111. The court’s Lemon test analysis was also insufficient. While it acknowledged that both 
the inquiry into the use of a minister’s home and the inquiry into who qualified as a “minister 
of the gospel” for purposes of the parsonage allowance implicated government entanglement 
with religion, it ultimately chose to defer to Congress rather than establishing a framework for 
deciding between two potential entanglements. Id. at 434–35. Evaluating such competing 
entanglements under the Lemon test is beyond the scope of this article, though, and will have 
to wait for a subsequent article. 
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III. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE TEST 
While the Seventh Circuit appears to have created the name,112 the Supreme Court 
established the historical significance test in Town of Greece v. Galloway.113 In Town 
of Greece, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether legislative prayer 
violated the Establishment Clause.114 In its analysis, the Court explained that “it is 
not necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where 
history shows that the specific practice is permitted. Any test the Court adopts must 
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the 
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”115 
Adopting the historical significance test as a potential Establishment Clause test, 
the Seventh Circuit looked at the long tradition of tax exemptions for religion. It 
explained that “[f]or over two centuries, the states have implemented church property 
tax exemptions in various forms.”116 It pointed out that constitutional challenges to 
these property tax exemptions have been unsuccessful and that the federal 
government enacted religious property tax exemptions as far back as 1802.117 The 
court found the plaintiffs’ objection that property taxes differ substantively from 
income taxes “too fine a distinction,” and ultimately decided that Congress “was 
continuing its ‘historical practice[]’ of exempting certain church resources from 
taxation.”118 Thus, it held, allowing clergy to exclude housing allowances from their 
gross income was consistent with a long history of constitutionally permissible tax 
exemptions granted to churches.119 
While the Seventh Circuit baldly asserted the history of church tax exemptions, 
its opinion neither laid out that history nor analyzed it. Rather, the opinion cited 
 
 
 112. A Westlaw search for “historical significance test” in All Content brings thirteen hits. 
The only case that includes “historical significance test” is the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Gaylor. Ten secondary sources include the phrase, and seven of those are discussing the 
Gaylor case. (One of the other three also deals with a question of religion, while the other two 
have no Establishment Clause relationship at all.) The search also comes up with two briefs, 
both of which use it citing the Gaylor case. 
 113. 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
 114. Id. at 569–70 (“The Court must decide whether the town of Greece, New York, 
imposes an impermissible establishment of religion by opening its monthly board meetings 
with a prayer.”). 
 115. Id. at 577. After the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Gaylor, the Supreme Court issued 
an opinion adopting a type of historical significance analysis. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist 
Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2083 (2019). That case is not entirely consonant with the Seventh 
Circuit’s version of the test, however. The Seventh Circuit was analyzing the historical 
significance of a law providing special treatment to religious individuals. The Supreme Court, 
by contrast, was analyzing the historical significance of “an established monument, symbol, 
or practice.” Id. at 2082. Although the Seventh Circuit dismissed Gaylor’s argument that the 
historical significance test applied only to legislative prayer, Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 
420, 435 n.11 (7th Cir. 2019), the Supreme Court’s subsequent application of the historical 
significance test does little to suggest it envisions the test as broad enough to capture tax laws. 
 116. Gaylor, 919 F.3d  at 436. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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Professor John Witte, Jr. in asserting that states have granted religious tax 
exemptions in various forms over the last two centuries.120 However, the court 
appears not to have read the article it so approvingly cited, because it failed to notice 
that the article criticized precisely this surface-level narrative of two centuries of 
consistent and uncontroversial property tax exemptions for religious property. In 
evaluating the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Walz that, among other things, 200 
years of states sanctioning religious tax exemptions supported their constitutionality, 
Professor Witte argued that “[w]hile the Court's conclusion on so tender and 
tempestuous an issue may have been inevitable, its arguments are not ineluctable.”121 
In fact, he wrote, “[t]he Court's historical argument depends too heavily upon 
questionable assertions of fact and selective presentation of evidence.”122 While there 
is a long history of tax exemptions for religion, there is an equally long history of 
criticisms of those exemptions.123 Moreover, through much of the country’s early 
history, exemptions were available, not to religion at large, but to established 
churches, while dissenting religions faced taxation.124 
Still, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Town of Greece historical significance test 
as one of its analytical tools. Town of Greece provides that “[a]ny test the Court 
adopts must acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has 
withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change.”125 In this Section, I will 
take that analysis seriously. Rather than imagining 200 years of unbroken tax 
exemptions for religion, this Section will proceed to look at the history of tax 
exemptions for religion within the framework that the Supreme Court and the 
Seventh Circuit adopted as the historical significance test. First, I will look broadly 
at religious tax exemptions in the country’s founding years. Then, I will look at the 
specific history of state tax exemptions for parsonages. 
A. A (Brief) History of Religious Property Tax Exemptions
Today, every state and the District of Columbia exempts at least some religiously- 
owned property from its property tax.126 Those exemptions do not always trace an 
unbroken, uncontroversial line back to the founding of the country or the state.127 In 
the following sections, I will attempt to unveil the “questionable assertions of fact 
and selective presentation of evidence”128 that have dogged judicial decisions 
looking at the history of religious tax exemptions. The following subsection will look 
at religious tax exemptions as they existed during the founding years of the United 
States. The next subsection will look at how property tax exemptions for religious 
property developed over the course of the nineteenth century. 
120. Id. (citing John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or
Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 365–66 (1991)). 
121. Witte, supra note 120, at 365–66.
122. Id. at 367.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014).
126. See infra notes 187–91 and accompanying text.
127. Witte, supra note 120, at 367.
128. Id.
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1. At the Time of the Framers
Before looking at the state of religious tax exemptions at the time of the Framers, 
a caveat: the existence of tax exemptions for religious property in the founding years 
provides very little information about the Framers’ views of the constitutionality of 
such exemptions. While the meaning of “direct tax” in the Constitution is not 
completely clear, it certainly includes a tax on real property.129 As such, the 
Constitution would require the federal government to apportion the property tax to 
the states according to their populations.130 This apportionment would lead to citizens 
paying different rates of tax on their property depending on the population of the 
state they lived in.131 An apportioned property tax could “create great inequality and 
injustice,”132 and thus, federal direct taxes were rare.133 States face no such 
limitation.134 Because the federal government could not realistically tax real 
property, questions of the tax treatment of religious property necessarily find their 
answers at the state level. 
It is also important to keep in mind that during the first 150 years of the United 
States, the religion clauses did not apply to limit state governments’ actions. The 
Establishment Clause was not incorporated against the states until 1947.135  Early 
state constitutions generally adopted whatever religious protections the state had 
offered prior to independence.136 As a result, state treatment of religious property 
does little to elucidate the constitutional limitations of tax benefits to religion.137 
Nonetheless, in this Article’s bid to explore the historical significance of tax-free 
parsonages, I will look at how the early states treated religious property for tax 
purposes. 
129. Dawn Johnsen & Walter Dellinger, The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax, 
93 IND. L.J. 111, 121 (2018) (“Finally, real property or land taxes constitute the third ‘other 
direct’ tax that the evidence suggests the Framers may have had in mind.”); see also Erik M. 
Jensen, Did the Sixteenth Amendment Ever Matter? Does It Matter Today?, 108 NW. U. L. 
REV. 799, 808 (2014) (“And we can be certain that a tax on real property is direct.”). 
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. For a more thorough discussion of federal direct taxes, 
see infra notes 371–81. 
131. Cf. Samuel D. Brunson, Paying for Gun Violence, 104 MINN. L. REV. 605, 628–29 
(2019). 
132. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 174 (1796).
133. See infra notes 375–76 and accompanying text.
134. Evgeny Magidenko, Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes, 45 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 57, 126 (2015) (“Unlike the federal government, the states do not have any 
federal constitutional restrictions on their ability to levy direct taxes.”). 
135. “The broad meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted
by this Court in its decisions concerning an individual’s religious freedom rendered since the 
Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state 
action abridging religious freedom. There is every reason to give the same application and 
broad interpretation to the ‘establishment of religion’ clause.” Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing 
Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. 
L.J. 669, 670 (2013).
136. Witte, supra note 120, at 380.
137. For a discussion of state constitutions’ treatment of religion, see infra Section III.A.2.
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In many cases, the early states exempted church property from taxation. The 
reason for such continued exemptions is unclear: they “simply continued, even as 
churches were disestablished, with little apparent discussion.”138 The importance of 
the existing exemptions is also debatable in many cases. Unlike today, in the early 
Republic, states were inconsistent in imposing and collecting taxes. As of 1796, for 
instance, New York had not levied a general or direct tax in eight years.139 In fact, 
New York’s laws did not even define objects of taxation.140 Instead, “the Legislature 
determines the quotas to be paid by counties, [and] the supervisors of counties 
determine the quotas of towns, which last are apportioned to individuals by 
assessors.”141 While Pennsylvania had a defined set of tax laws, it, too, went a full 
decade without imposing a general tax.142 
Many of the states continued their colonial tax exemptions for churches and for 
ministers of the gospel after Independence. At the time, individuals’ income was 
largely irrelevant, except in Delaware, which solely imposed an income tax.143 The 
other states imposed poll and property taxes as part of their panoply of taxes.144 A 
number of states exempted ministers of the gospel from their poll taxes, while more 
exempted church property from the property tax. In neither event, though, was the 
benefit of exemption allowed solely to religion. 
For example, Pennsylvania exempted ministers from its poll tax.145 It also 
exempted schoolmasters, mechanics, and manufacturers.146 Connecticut exempted 
“settled ministers of the Christian religion” and the president of Yale college.147 
Rhode Island also exempted settled ministers of the Christian religion from poll 
taxes.148 In Massachusetts, settled ministers were joined by the “president, fellows, 
professors, tutors, librarian, and students of Harvard college,” as well as grammar-
school masters and the masters of other academies.149 Vermont similarly exempted 
“settled ministers of the Christian religion, the president and tutors of colleges, 
constant schoolmasters, students of colleges, until three years after receiving their 
first academical degrees; as, also, in favor of persons disabled by sickness or 
infirmity.”150 
And how did the states treat religious property under their property tax regimes? 
Those that granted exemptions for religious property did so in one of three manners: 
 
 
 138. STEPHEN DIAMOND, EFFICIENCY AND BENEVOLENCE: PHILANTHROPIC TAX 
EXEMPTIONS IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 115, 
118 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002). 
 139. See H.R. DOC. NO. 4-100, at 425 (1796). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 427. 
 143. Id. at 429. 
 144. A “poll tax” is a tax under which “[e]veryone is assessed a tax bill that does not depend 
on how much they earn or any other economic activity.” LEONARD E. BURMAN & JOEL 
SLEMROD, TAXES IN AMERICA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 128 (2012). 
 145. H.R. DOC. NO. 4-100, at 427 (1796). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 424. 
 148. Id. at 423. 
 149. Id. at 420. 
 150. Id. at 418. 
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they exempted ministers broadly from poll and property taxes, they exempted 
property based on its ownership, or they exempted property based on its use. 
Connecticut and Massachusetts provide examples of the first manner: they exempted 
ministers from their poll taxes and also exempted the ministers’ property from 
property tax.151 Vermont also exempted ministers’ property, but only to the extent its 
value did not exceed 500 pounds.152 (States that exempted property owned by 
ministers from property tax also exempted the property of other classes of people 
who were exempt from the poll tax.) 
The second manner of exemption was for property belonging to religious 
organizations. South Carolina was the only state fitting into this category, with an 
exemption for “[p]roperty belonging to religious or charitable societies, cities, or free 
schools.”153 Delaware theoretically also fit into this category, but its income tax was 
not working well. In 1796, it had enacted, though not yet implemented, a property 
tax which would exempt, among other things, “property belonging to . . . any . . . 
religious society.”154  
The final manner of exemption looked at the use of the property. In addition to 
exempting the property of ministers, Connecticut exempted “all lands or buildings 
sequestered for schools, or other public or pious uses.”155 Maryland exempted 
“houses for public worship,”156 while Virginia and Rhode Island were more explicit 
about their use requirement, with both states exempting “houses dedicated to public 
worship.”157  
This ad hoc collection of approaches to religious exemptions is hardly surprising. 
In these early years there was not yet a “universal system of taxation, no general 
property tax that attempted to identify all property within the jurisdiction and tax it 
at the same ad valorem rate.”158 Exemptions existed more as a way to demonstrate 
government favoritism than as an instrument of financial benefit.159 Exemptions were 
largely carried over from colonial days, before the passage of the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights. It would be a century and a half until the Establishment Clause 
even applied to the states. While the early tax laws of several states did exempt 
religious property from taxation, baldly pointing to them as evidence that religious 
property tax exemptions have been acceptable since the Founding era “ignores the 
variety of theories that supported these laws.”160 
Looking at the state-level property tax exemptions around the time of the 
Founding does little more to help determine the historical significance of an 
exemption for parsonages. Its lack of relevance comes in part because the 
 
 
 151. Id. at 420, 424. 
 152. Id. at 418. 
 153. Id. at 435. 
 154. Id. at 429. 
 155. Id. at 424. 
 156. Id. at 429. 
 157. Id. at 423, 431. 
 158. DIAMOND, supra note 138, at 118–19. 
 159. Id. at 119. 
 160. Witte, supra note 120, at 367. Those theories ranged from support for exemption 
deriving from “the almost innate promptings of the human heart” to the lack of income from 
property. Diamond, supra note 138, at 121–22. 
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Establishment Clause was irrelevant to the question of what states could do. It is also 
unhelpful because the exemptions that existed for religious property never explicitly 
mentioned parsonages. Certain minister-owned property was exempt, and certain 
property used as a house of worship was exempt, but only one state exempted 
property by virtue of being owned by a church. To understand the place of parsonages 
in state tax regimes, then, will require us to look at tax developments over the 
subsequent two centuries. 
2. Religious Property Taxes after the Founding 
While the early states largely kept their colonial property tax exemptions intact, 
the exemptions were largely ad hoc, and largely limited to organizations that had 
received exemption as part of their initial charter. By the late nineteenth century, the 
foundations of those exemptions had grown shaky.161 Disestablishment, the states’ 
move away from English equity law, and the emerging preference for universal, not 
selective, taxation meant that states would have to come up with a new theory of 
exemption if they were to continue to exempt religious property from taxation.162  
The country began to come to a general consensus about exempting religious 
property from its general property taxes: states should exempt church property from 
taxation because churches benefited both society in general and the state in 
particular.163 If that were the case—and there was broad agreement that it was—the 
exemption benefitted, not religion, but the state itself.164 In fact, proponents of 
exemption argued that taxing church property would “be unjust and injurious both to 
the churches and to the State.”165 
Still, this emerging consensus faced growing pains. In particular, it is worth 
looking at California and at the District of Columbia to illustrate that the line between 
carryover colonial exemptions and the modern religious property tax exemption is 
not a clean line. 
The District of Columbia provides an instructive look at how the federal 
government viewed property tax exemptions for religious property. While the 
Establishment Clause did not apply to the states until its incorporation in 1947,166 the 
Bill of Rights directly constrains the District of Columbia, “without need for the 
intermediary of incorporation.”167 
In 1874, Congress enacted a property tax in the District of Columbia, taxing 
property in Washington at a rate of three percent of assessed value, in Georgetown 
 
 
 161. Witte, supra note 120, at 380–81. 
 162. Id. at 381–86. 
 163. Id. at 386–87. 
 164. Id. at 387. Still, some continued to oppose the exemption of religious property from 
the property tax. Many critics “focused on Catholic opulence . . . and contrasted it to a 
Protestant esthetic of simplicity.” Diamond, supra note 138, at 126. Others even included 
“ostentatious Protestant churches in the condemnation.” Id. 
 165. Henry W. Foote, The Taxation of Churches, 7 UNITARIAN REV. & RELIGIOUS 
MAGAZINE 349, 351 (1877). 
 166. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 167. Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 391 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. D.C. v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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of 2.5 percent, and outside of those two cities, at two percent.168 The law exempted 
property owned by the federal government, the District of Columbia, and by 
charitable and educational institutions.169 The tax commissioners in the District 
understood that this exemption did not include churches, and began to levy taxes on 
religious property.170 The District continued to tax churches for five years, until 
Congress passed a new law repealing the property tax as it applied to “church 
property which was actually held and used for the purpose of divine worship.”171 
Congress not only exempted churches in the District of Columbia from the property 
tax—it also returned to the religious trustees the title of church property that had been 
sold for nonpayment of taxes and required the District to refund property taxes that 
had been paid by churches.172 Ultimately the District of Columbia’s experiment with 
taxing church property had no substantive lasting impact. Nonetheless, for five years 
in the late nineteenth century, the federal government imposed a property tax on all 
religiously owned property, including parsonages.173 
California, too, taxed religiously owned property for more than thirty years. 
Acquired by the United States in 1848,174 the territory of California became a state 
two years later.175 Between its acquisition by the United States and its attaining 
statehood, California drafted and ratified a constitution.176 That original constitution 
illustrated the move to universal taxation, providing that “[t]axation shall be equal 
and uniform throughout the State. All property in this State shall be taxed in 
proportion to its value . . . .”177  
In spite of the state constitution’s plain language, the California legislature 
originally provided for pre-statehood exemptions to continue.178 Thus, by 1859, 
California law exempted land owned by:  
[C]olleges, school houses and other buildings for the purpose of 
education, public hospitals, asylums, poor houses and other charitable 
institutions for the relief of the indigent and afflicted, churches, chapels 
and other buildings for religious worship, together with lots of ground 
and other property appurtenant thereto; cemeteries and graveyards; the 
 
 
 168. An Act for the Government of the District of Columbia, and for Other Purposes, ch. 
337, 18 Stat. 117 § 4 (1874). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Diamond, supra note 138, at 125. 
 171. An Act to Relieve the Churches of the District of Columbia, and to Clear the Title of 
the Trustees of Such Property, ch. 33, 21 Stat. 23 (1879).  
 172. Id. 
 173. Moreover, it is not clear that the 1879 law would have exempted parsonages. Its 
language was limited to property used for “the purpose of divine worship.” Id. That use 
requirement has gone different ways in different jurisdictions. 
 174. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without 
Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581, 582 (2001). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 586. 
 177. CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. XI, § 13. 
 178. Diamond, supra note 138, at 120. 
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property of widows and orphan children to the amount of one thousand 
dollars; growing crops and mining claims.179 
The state supreme court stripped virtually all of these property tax exemptions away 
in 1868.180 The court explained that if the legislature had the power to exempt crops 
and mining claims, “the exemption may be carried still further, until property of one 
class is made to bear the whole burden of taxation.”181 Any exemption that included 
private property, the court held, was “in plain violation of the command of the 
Constitution.”182 
In 1900, California amended its constitution to allow for the exemption of 
religious property.183 But for the more than three decades between the McCreery 
decision and the amendment of the state constitution, California’s property tax 
exemplified the policy of universal taxation, and religious organizations paid 
property tax on their property. Because the state’s gap in exemption resulted from a 
policy of universal taxation in its state constitution, it does not speak to the 
constitutionality of exempting parsonages from the property tax. It does, however, 
undercut the clean narrative of two centuries of unbroken tax exemption for religious 
property. The Establishment Clause did not prohibit states or the federal government 
from taxing religiously owned property.184 
IV. PROPERTY TAXES AND PARSONAGES 
Even after religious property tax exemptions became universal, the question of 
the treatment of parsonages did not. While most states expressly exempt houses of 
worship from their property tax, in many states other property belonging to religious 
organizations qualifies for exemption only if its use qualifies as religious or 
otherwise charitable.185 When it comes to parsonages, states have answered the 
question of whether the property tax exemption applies inconsistently, both across 
states and across time. In this part, I will first categorize states according to whether 
and how they currently exempt parsonages from their property tax. Next, to 
determine whether the exemptions have “withstood the critical scrutiny of time and 
political change,”186 I will look at those states that have changed their property tax 
treatment of parsonages. 
 
 
 179. People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432, 457 (1868). 
 180. Diamond, supra note 138, at 120. 
 181. McCreery, 34 Cal. at 457. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Diamond, supra note 138, at 120. 
 184. Even today, mere religious ownership does not guarantee property tax exemptions. In 
Illinois, for example, an exempt church that leases space in its building to a preschool must 
pay property tax on that portion of the property used by the preschool. First Presbyterian 
Church of Libertyville v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, No. 09 PT 0066 (2010), 
https://www2.illinois.gov/rev/research/legalinformation/hearings/pt/Documents/pt10-10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/968W-H838]. 
 185. See, e.g., JANNE GALLAGHER, THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION, 
in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD 3, 5 (Evelyn Brody 
ed., 2002). 
 186. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014). 
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A. Current Property Tax Treatment of Parsonages 
Today, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia statutorily exempt 
parsonages from property tax.187 The other twenty-one states provide constitutional 
or statutory property tax exemptions for at least some religious property, but do not 
specifically exempt parsonages. In eight of these states, courts (or, in one case, 
regulations) include parsonages in the set of exempt religiously owned property.188 
In three states, courts allow the exemption of some parsonages, depending on the use 
of those parsonages.189 In three states, the general religious property tax exemption 
does not exempt parsonages from paying property taxes.190 In the remaining four 
states, courts have not ruled on the question of whether parsonages qualify as exempt 
religious property.191 
1. Explicit Exemptions 
Even among the states that explicitly exempt parsonages by statute, the exemption 
is not always absolute. All impose certain limits and requirements on the property 
tax exemption. For example, every state that explicitly exempts parsonages requires 
that the parsonage be owned by the religious organization, not by individual 
clergy.192  
There are also other requirements that differ among the various jurisdictions. In 
Washington, D.C., any given church or congregation can own only one parsonage 
 
 
 187. See infra Appendix 1 for a list of the states that explicitly exempt parsonages from the 
property tax. It is important to note that, while I include Hawaii among the twenty-nine states 
that explicitly exempt parsonages, it is in a slightly odd position: in 2016, the state eliminated 
its state real property tax. 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws 85, 86 § 6. Years earlier, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court held that the state’s constitution had shifted the authority to tax real property from the 
state to the counties. State ex rel. Anzai v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 57 P.3d 433, 435 (Haw. 
2002). Prior to the 2016 repeal, state law exempted “[p]roperty used for church purposes, 
including . . . parsonages.” HI REV. STAT. § 246-32(b)(3) (2012). While the Hawaii legislature 
repealed that provision in 2016, four of the five counties in Hawaii have enacted a property 
tax exemption with identical language. MAUI, HAW., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 3.48.495(b)(3); 
HAW., CNTY. CODE 1983 § 19-77(b)(3) (2016 Edition, as amended);  HONOLULU, HAW., REV. 
ORDINANCE 8-10.10(b)(3); KAUAʻI, HAW., 3 CNTY. CODE Tit. III, § 5A-11.10(b)(3). 
 188. See infra Appendix 2. 
 189. See infra Appendix 3. 
 190. See infra Appendix 4. 
 191. See infra Appendix 5. 
 192. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 29.45.030(b) (West) (exempting parsonages as long 
as they are owned by a religious organization); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 462 (McKinney) 
(exempting “property owned by a religious corporation while actually used by the officiating 
clergymen thereof for residential purposes”). New York provides a partial exception to this 
broader rule. The New York property tax law provides a special exemption for “[r]eal property 
owned by a minister of the gospel, priest or rabbi of any denomination.” N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX 
LAW § 460 (McKinney). For any such clergy residing in the state, up to $1500 of real property 
is exempt from the state property tax. Id. This exemption is not precisely an exemption of a 
parsonage, though: it is not limited to residential real property, nor to property used or 
occupied by clergy. 
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that is exempt from property taxation.193 New Jersey exempts up to two parsonages 
owned by “any religious corporation of this State.”194 
New Jersey also exempts the land parsonages sit on, as long as that land does not 
exceed five acres.195 North Dakota limits the size of exempt parsonages to two acres 
if the parsonage is not located on the same parcel of land as the buildings used for 
religious purposes.196 Rhode Island limits the exempt amount of land on which a 
parsonage sits to the greater of one acre or the minimum lot size permitted where the 
parsonage is located.197 
Texas imposes a size limitation similar to Rhode Island’s: Texas exempts real 
property owned by a religious organization that “is reasonably necessary for use as 
a residence,” but in no event larger than one acre.198 In addition, to qualify for the 
exemption, the parsonage must be used “exclusively as a residence” for clergy and 
cannot produce any revenue for the religious organization that owns it.199 In Indiana, 
while parsonages are exempt from property tax, the religious organization that owns 
it must provide an affidavit to the assessor stating that the parsonage houses clergy 
and that the religious organization does not make a profit from the parsonage.200 
Maine goes another direction with its limitations. Instead of limiting the size of 
exempt parsonages, it limits the exempt value. A parsonage in Maine is exempt from 
property taxation on its first $20,000 of value.201 Illinois goes yet another direction. 
Property owned by religious organizations and used as housing for clergy is exempt, 
provided that the clergy must, “as a condition of their employment or association, 
reside in the facility.”202 
These twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have made the explicit 
legislative decision to exempt parsonages from the property tax. It is important to 
keep in mind, though, that none of these states provides an unconstrained exemption 
for any housing designated as a parsonage. Rather, they all require that the parsonage 
be owned by an exempt religious organization. Many also impose additional 
limitations, including limitations on the size, location, or value of the parsonage. In 
all of these states, there is an implicit recognition that exempting parsonages is an 




 193. D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1002 (West). 
 194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West). 
 195. Id. 
 196. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 57-02-08(9)(a) (West). If the parsonage is located on the 
same parcel of land, North Dakota does not impose any acreage limitations. Id. 
 197. 44 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-3-3 (West). 
 198. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20(a)(3) (West). 
 199. Id. 
 200. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-10-21(c). 
 201. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 36, § 652(1)(G). 
 202. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/15-40(b). That requirement mirrors the federal income tax’s 
general exclusion for employer-provided housing, available only if, among other 
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his employer as a condition of his employment.” I.R.C. § 119(a)(2). 
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2. Non-Statutory Exemptions for Parsonages 
The remaining twenty-one states do not constitutionally or statutorily exempt 
parsonages from their property taxes. They do, however, exempt at least some 
religiously owned or used property. Many use a similar formulation to determine 
whether the property tax reaches religious property: they exempt property that is both 
owned by a religious organization and is used exclusively for religious purposes.203 
The question then becomes whether housing clergy is a religious purpose under the 
property tax exemption. 
Eight states have concluded that it is. For seven states in this category, the courts 
have exempted parsonages. For instance, in Delaware there is a statutory exemption 
for property “owned by . . . any church or religious society, and not held by way of 
investment.”204 When the city of Wilmington assessed a city and school tax against 
a rectory building owned by Roman Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, the diocese 
challenged the validity of the assessment.205 The diocese argued that a rectory fell 
within the state’s exemption from property tax, while the city argued the opposite.206 
The court ultimately found that it fit within the statutory exemption for religious 
property because the rectory belonged to a religious organization, and because it was 
not held for investment.207 
The Nebraska statutory exemption for religious property applies to a narrower 
slice of property. As with Delaware, in Nebraska a religious organization must both 
own the land and not use it for financial gain.208 In addition, for religiously owned 
property to qualify for the exemption, a religious organization must use the land 
“exclusively for . . . religious . . . purposes.”209  
Nebraska courts had to wrestle with the question of whether housing clergy 
qualified as a religious purpose. Surprisingly, they did not wrestle with the question 
until the 1990s.210 The court emphasized that “exclusively” meant “primarily,” and 
 
 
 203. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. X, § 6(1); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 427.1(8)(a) (West) 
(exempting property  “owned by a religious institution . . . if all monetary and in-kind profits 
of the religious institution or society resulting from use or lease of the grounds are used 
exclusively by the religious institution or society for the appropriate objects of the institution 
or society”). 
 204. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8105 (West). 
 205. St. Stanislaus Kostka Church v. Mayor of Wilmington, 105 A.2d 596, 597 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1954). 
 206. Id. at 598. 
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 208. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-202(1)(d) (West). Nebraska law imposes two other rules 
that are not relevant here. Exempt land cannot be used to sell alcoholic liquors for more than 
twenty hours per week and cannot be owned by organizations that discriminate based on an 
individual’s race, color, or national origin. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Nebraska Ann. Conf. of United Methodist Church v. Scotts Bluff Cnty. Bd. of 
Equalization, 499 N.W.2d. 543, 547 (Neb. 1993) (“This is the first opportunity for this court 
to address the question of whether a cleric's use of a parsonage constitutes exclusive religious 
use for exemption purposes.”). Perhaps the question had never come to the courts previously 
because the taxing authorities in Nebraska had previously assumed that parsonages qualified 
as tax-exempt, notwithstanding the ambiguity in the law. Id. at 545 (“The parsonage has 
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that incidental non-religious use would not cost a property its tax exemption.211 Still, 
to qualify as tax exempt, housing clergy has to qualify as a religious purpose. The 
court determined that it does, as long as the housed member of clergy engages in 
ministerial work full time, the employer-church provides the housing for the church’s 
and its members’ convenience, and the parsonage “serves numerous religious 
purposes.”212 
Oklahoma courts had to make a similar determination. Like Nebraska, the 
Oklahoma constitution exempts “all property used exclusively for religious and 
charitable purposes.”213 While the Oklahoma constitution does not appear to impose 
an ownership requirement, it imposes a similar exclusive use requirement. The court 
explained that this exclusive use requirement had three parts:  the parsonage had to 
be owned by a church and to house a pastor engaged in full-time ministerial work, 
the church had to provide the parsonage as part of the pastor’s compensation, and the 
parsonage had to “serve[] various religious purposes.”214 As long as it met these 
criteria, the court said, it met the exclusive use requirement and qualified for tax 
exemption.215 
While the Oklahoma court came to the same conclusion as the Nebraska court, 
the conclusion was neither inevitable nor uncontroversial. In fact, one judge 
dissented from the court’s conclusion. Justice Hodges pointed out that the parsonage 
was a “private dwelling residence,” not unlike any other non-exempt private 
residence.216 In general, the dissent explained, exemptions from property tax are 
strictly construed.217 Because the use of a parsonage was personal rather than 
religious, and because the state constitution did not expressly list parsonages as 
exempt, the dissent argued that any ambiguity in the constitution should be read 
against granting the exemption. 
In looking at non-statutory exemptions for parsonages, New Mexico, the eighth 
state in this category, is something of an outlier. Under New Mexico’s constitution, 
“all church property not used for commercial purposes . . . shall be exempt from 
taxation.”218 While a parsonage could certainly fit into the category of church 
property not used for commercial purposes, the property tax statute is unhelpful in 
determining whether the constitutional exemption includes parsonages. It merely 
provides that all property is subject to property tax valuation unless explicitly 
exempted.219 And, in relevant part, it explicitly exempted “property exempt from 
property taxation under the federal or state constitution, federal law, the Property Tax 
Code or other laws.”220 Rather than relying on the courts to determine whether 
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qualifies as church property not used for commercial purposes, New Mexico enacted 
regulations providing that the state constitution’s exemption includes both buildings 
used for religious purposes and buildings used “for residences of the priests, 
ministers, chaplains, pastors or rabbis.”221 
As with the states that explicitly exempt parsonages from the property tax, 
parsonages end up being exempt in these states. They are not exempt, though, as a 
result of legislative decision. Instead, they are exempt because courts have 
determined that housing clergy meets the broad exemption requirements for 
religiously owned property broadly. By and large, courts in these states have 
determined that providing housing for clergy serves primarily religious purposes, and 
that the personal benefits to clergy are, at most, incidental. 
3. Parsonage Exemption Depends on Use 
As with the prior category, California, Oregon, and Tennessee provide for a 
general property tax exemption for religious property, but none of the three states 
expressly exempts parsonages. Unlike the eight states in the prior category, though, 
courts have held that parsonages qualify for the exemption, but only under certain 
circumstances. 
The California property tax exemption for religious property is similar in many 
ways to Nebraska’s. It too applies to property used “exclusively for religious . . . 
purposes” and owned by religious entities.222 The law goes on to specify that the 
owner cannot be organized for profit, that the net earnings of the owner cannot inure 
to the benefit of any individual or shareholder, and that the owner use the property 
“for the actual operation of the exempt activity.”223 For parsonages, this raises similar 
questions as those answered by the Nebraska court: is housing clergy an exclusively 
religious purpose, and is it the actual operation of the exempt activity? 
In answering these questions, the California Court of Appeals explained that 
whether a parsonage qualified for exemption had to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.224 The owner of the parsonage had the burden of demonstrating that it used the 
parsonage “for some type of institutional necessity” and that this institutional 
necessity was something more than merely providing a residence for clergy.225  
Oregon provides an even narrower religious exemption from property tax than 
California. “[H]ouses of public worship” owned by religious institutions qualify for 
the exemption.226 Other property owned by religious institutions qualifies, too, 
provided that property is used by the religious organization “solely for 




 221. N.M. ADMIN. CODE 3.6.5.15(L)(2) (as amended in 2001). 
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In determining whether religious property is exempt from property tax, Oregon 
courts apply a two-prong inquiry. The first prong asks whether the religious use of 
the property is “primarily for the benefit of the church.”228 The second prong asks 
whether the religious use of the property is “reasonably necessary for the furthering 
of the religious aims of the church.”229 
The court’s analysis under the first prong recognizes the distinction between 
primary and incidental benefits. As long as the religious organization gets the 
primary benefit of the use of the property, incidental benefits to individuals will not 
disqualify it.230 By contrast, where the primary benefit lies elsewhere, and the 
religious organization only receives an incidental benefit, the property will fail the 
first prong. 
The second prong applies differently to residential property than it does to non-
residential property.231 For residential property such as a parsonage to qualify as 
exempt, the religious organization must require the clergy member to live there 
(either as a matter of religious doctrine or out of practical necessity) and “the 
proximity of the residence to the house of worship must be necessary to further 
religious objectives.”232  
So, for instance, where the “continuous presence” of clergy is needed “to attend 
to the religious needs of the congregation,” and the parsonage is “substantially used 
for church functions or rites, entertaining or counseling members of the church and 
the like,” a parsonage can qualify as tax-exempt under Oregon law.233 Oregon courts 
are perfectly willing to hold that religious organizations must pay property tax on 
parsonages that do not meet the two criteria.234 
Finally, Tennessee also exempts property owned by religious institutions 
provided that the religious institution uses the property for “carrying out one (1) or 
more of the exempt purposes for which the institution was created or exists.”235 As 
with Oregon and Nebraska, the statutory exemption does not explicitly include 
parsonages. The Tennessee Court of Appeals explained that, while parsonages may 
qualify as exempt, they “per se, are not given exemption under the statute; only those 
pieces of property that are used purely and exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific or educational purposes are exempt.”236 In Tennessee, the court held that 
merely housing clergy—even where the clergy uses the parsonage as a home base 
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for their evangelizing—does not make its use exclusively religious.237 The Tennessee 
court also held that even using a parsonage purely and exclusively for religious 
purposes does not automatically grant it a property tax exemption; any given church 
can only own one property tax-exempt parsonage.238 
These three states are similar to the seven states that judicially exempted all 
parsonages. They, too, had to grapple with the question of whether providing housing 
for clergy constituted the carrying out of a religious purpose. Unlike the previous 
seven, though, their courts determined that housing clergy only sometimes primarily 
benefited the religious organization. Parsonages used solely for housing clergy did 
not qualify. As such, the question of exempting parsonages from the property tax in 
these states is a question of fact, and each parsonage must be considered individually. 
4. Parsonages Are Not Exempt 
Like the states discussed in the previous two subsections, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Utah have a general property tax exemption for some property owned by religious 
institutions. In these three states, however, the exemption does not extend to 
parsonages. The reasoning differs in each state, but the result is the same: religious 
organizations that own parsonages in these three states must pay property tax on 
those parsonages. 
Ohio law exempts “[h]ouses used exclusively for public worship, the books and 
furniture in them, and the ground attached to them” from the property tax, as long as 
the houses are not leased or otherwise used for profit.239 It also exempts real property 
“owned and operated by a church that is used primarily for church retreats or church 
camping, and that is not used as a permanent residence.”240  
By definition, a parsonage is used as a permanent residence by clergy and is 
therefore excluded from the exemption. In 1989, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a 
decision by the state’s Board of Tax Appeals holding that a parsonage did not qualify 
as exempt from property taxation.241 More recently, in dicta, the supreme court 
characterized the idea that residential property does not qualify for tax exemption as 
“well-settled,”242 though only the dissent referred explicitly to the statutory exclusion 
of permanent residences.243 
Unlike Ohio, Pennsylvania does not explicitly exclude parsonages from its 
property tax exemption. Rather, it provides a general religious exemption for “[a]ll 
churches, meeting-houses, or other actual places of regularly stated religious 
worship.”244 According to the courts, regularly stated religious worship means that 
the “primary application” of the property must be for regularly scheduled and 
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consistent “conduct of worship.”245 Meanwhile, the actual place requirement does 
not require that the property be used solely for worship. Rather, its “primary purpose” 
must be worship, but a qualifying property does not lose its exemption if it has other 
incidental uses.246 
Under this analysis, parsonages do not qualify as actual places of regularly stated 
religious worship. In dealing with whether a building that was formerly used as a 
parsonage was exempt from tax, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 
acknowledged, offhandedly and without analysis, that “[t]he home was used as a 
parsonage until August 23, 2001, during which time it was taxable.”247 Given the 
relatively specific requirements under Pennsylvania statutory and common law, a 
parsonage used principally for housing clergy is subject to state property tax. 
Finally, the Utah Constitution exempts “property owned by a nonprofit entity used 
exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes.”248 As with other states 
that have an exemption that excludes property used “exclusively” for religious 
purposes, Utah courts had to determine whether housing clergy qualified as an 
exclusive religious purpose. In 1976, the question of whether parsonages qualified 
for exemption reached the Utah Supreme Court for the first time.249 The court looked 
to other states without an express exemption, and determined that, while decisions 
went both ways, “the decided weight of authority supports the rule that parsonages, 
residences of ministers, and parish houses owned by a church and occupied as a 
residence by the pastor or priest of a church are not exempt from property taxes.”250 
Even though the church used the parsonage for some incidental church purposes, the 
court found that incidental church use did not meet the exclusive standard required 
by the state constitution.251 
5. Are Parsonages Exempt? 
Finally, four states do not explicitly exempt parsonages and courts have not 
adjudicated the question of exemption. Alabama exempts “all property, real and 
personal, used exclusively for religious worship.”252 In Arizona, the religious 
property tax exemption applies to property “used or held primarily for religious 
worship.”253 Colorado exempts property “which is owned and used solely and 
exclusively for religious purposes.”254 Finally, the Kentucky Constitution exempts 
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“real property owned and occupied by, and personal property both tangible and 
intangible owned by, institutions of religion.”255  
These four states’ property tax exemptions for religious property are similar to the 
exemptions of other states without an explicit exemption for parsonages. Whether a 
parsonage is exempt under their laws depends, in general, on whether the state 
considers housing clergy a religious or secular use. As we have seen, the answer is 
not obvious. Without some sort of administrative or judicial determination, it is not 
clear whether parsonages in these four states qualify for the religious property tax 
exemption. 
B. Historic Differences in the Treatment of Parsonages 
While the current property tax treatment of parsonages by the various states 
illustrates that exempting parsonages is neither necessary nor inevitable, the 
historical significance test requires courts to look not only at the present, but also at 
the past. And, appropriately, the Seventh Circuit did not rest its historical 
significance analysis merely on states’ present treatment of parsonages. Rather, the 
court held that the government, intervenors, and amici supporting the government 
had “provided substantial evidence of a lengthy tradition of tax exemptions for 
religion, particularly for church-owned property.”256 The varying approaches of 
current state laws demonstrates the degree to which this assertion brushes over the 
manner in which states analyze whether religiously owned property qualifies for 
exemption (which generally requires not only religious ownership, but also religious 
use).  
The court’s broad assertion also overlooks the historical variation in states’ 
property tax. Currently, the vast majority of states either explicitly exempt 
parsonages or find that parsonages can, under some circumstances, fit within the 
scope of the religious property tax exemption. Even in those states that grant an 
exemption for parsonages, the history of that exemption is often not a clean, 
unbroken line back through history. In a number of states, the courts initially found 
that parsonages were not exempt, which conclusion was, in some cases, overturned 
by state legislatures in the early- to mid-twentieth century. Some jurisdictions even 
went through periods in which no religiously owned property qualified for property 
tax exemptions. These changes in tax treatment highlight that exemption was not 
inevitable and that history does not clearly lean in the direction of exemption. 
If the Seventh Circuit is correct that the historical significance test is a proper 
Establishment Clause test to apply in looking at the constitutionality of the parsonage 
allowance, then we must actually look at the history of states grappling with the 
question of whether to exempt parsonages from the property tax. And that history 
demonstrates that, of the forty-four states and District of Columbia that clearly 
sometimes or always exempt parsonages from the property tax, thirteen have, at some 
point in the past, taxed parsonages. In most of these states, the law shifted to allow 
an exemption for parsonages in the early- to mid-twentieth century. These thirteen 
states represent about thirty percent of states that exempt parsonages from the 
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property tax. That means that about three in ten of the states that exempt parsonages 
enacted that exemption relatively late in the Seventh Circuit’s purported two 
centuries of states “implement[ing] church property tax exemptions in various 
forms.”257 Moreover, because these changes occurred before the incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause, they have little relevance to the parsonage allowance’s 
constitutionality. The remainder of this Part will discuss the states that disallowed 
property tax exemptions for parsonages at one point and now exempt them.258 It will 
divide the states (and the discussion) into three main categories: states that granted 
parsonages an exemption by amending their constitutions, states that granted 
parsonages an exemption legislatively, and states that granted parsonages an 
exemption judicially. 
1. Constitutional Change 
In four states, excluding parsonages from the property tax base required a 
constitutional change. In 1906, Minnesota became the first of these states to change 
its constitution. As early as 1867, the state supreme court held that, under its property 
tax law, a “parsonage owned by a church is not exempt from taxation.”259 A decade 
and a half later, the court explained that a parsonage was “clearly subject to taxation” 
because housing clergy was a secular, not a religious, use of property.260 By 1891, 
the court held that the question of a property tax exemption for a parsonage had been 
answered so clearly that it was “therefore no longer open.”261  
Then in 1906, Minnesota amended its constitution. While the amended 
constitution did not explicitly provide for the exemption of parsonages, it made two 
important changes to the exemption of religious property. First, it shifted from being 
a permissive exemption requiring implementing legislation to a self-executing 
provision.262 Second, it took language away from the provision. Where the 
constitution had previously provided for the exemption of “all churches, church 
property used for religious purposes, and houses of worship,” after the amendment, 
the constitution provided for the exemption of “all churches, church property, and 
houses of worship.”263 The court held that the “omission of these words cannot be 
deemed to have been inadvertent or without a purpose.”264 Rather, it allowed 
churches to be treated the same way educational institutions were treated, including 
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allowing a property tax exemption for parsonages owned by a church and occupied 
by its pastor.265 
Louisiana became the next of the four states to amend its constitution to grant a 
property tax exemption for parsonages owned by a religious organization. 
Nineteenth-century Louisiana embraced universal taxation with a general rule that 
all property was subject to the property tax.266 The state legislature exempted some 
classes of property from taxation, but only within the scope granted by the state 
constitution.267 The state supreme court held that “[t]he residence of the clergyman 
is in no proper or legitimate sense appurtenant to the church, and is not exempt from 
taxation,” and therefore was not within the constitutional scope of a property tax 
exemption.268 
In fact, the state’s 1879 constitution exempted only two types of religious property 
from taxation: “places of religious worship or burial.”269 In its subsequent 
constitution, however, the state had expanded the scope of permissible religious 
exemptions from the property tax. Louisiana’s constitutional expansion functioned 
differently from Minnesota’s, though. The 1913 Louisiana Constitution provided for 
the exemption not only of places of religious worship or burial, but also “the rectories 
and parsonages of churches and grounds thereunto appurtenant, used exclusively as 
residences for the ministers in charge of such churches.”270 Rather than making the 
list of constitutionally permissible exemptions broader generally, Louisiana 
specifically targeted parsonages for exemption. 
Next came Texas. In its 1875 constitutional convention, state legislators focused 
on “[p]roviding for equal and uniform taxation.”271 In part, that focus derived from 
“strong feeling[s] against exemptions previously granted by the legislature.”272 
Similar to Louisiana’s Constitution, the 1876 Texas Constitution’s only exemption 
for religious property applied to “actual places of religious worship.”273 To ensure 
that future legislatures did not expand the constitutional list of permissible 
exemptions, the constitution further provided that “all laws exempting property from 
taxation other than the property above mentioned, shall be void.”274 In a 1906 
amendment of the constitution, the legislature reemphasized its distrust of 
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exemptions, driving “an unnecessary nail in the exemption coffin by providing that 
all other exemptions shall be not just void but null and void.”275 
In 1918, a Texas court enforced the legislature’s will, holding that a parsonage 
was not “used exclusively for ‘public worship’ or ‘purely public charity,’” and 
therefore did not qualify for exemption from the property tax.276 In response, the 
legislature amended the state constitution.277 As of 1928, the Texas state constitution 
has provided that the legislature has the authority to exempt parsonages from the 
property tax.278 
More than two decades later, Georgia became the fourth state to amend its 
constitution to permit parsonages to escape paying property tax. In 1887, the state 
supreme court had explained that “[t]he property which belongs to a church is not 
exempt from taxation simply because it belongs to a church.”279 In fact, the court 
wrote, not only was the parsonage in question not exempt from taxation, but the 
“legislature has no power to exempt it from taxation.”280 Any attempt at exempting 
religious property other than places of public worship or burial (which were listed in 
the constitution) would be “simply void.”281 
In 1927, the state supreme court used parsonages to illustrate the types of property 
not exempt under the state constitution.282 It was not until 1953 that the legislature 
proposed a voter resolution that would add the words “and all property owned by 
religious groups used only for residential purposes and from which no income is 
derived” to the list of permissible religious property tax exemptions.283 The voters 
ratified the amendment to the constitution in 1954, making Georgia the last of the 
four states to enact the constitutional change necessary to permit the legislature to 
exempt parsonages from the state property tax.284 
2. Legislative Change 
In five other states, a simple legislative change (without the need for any 
amendment of the constitution) sufficed to exempt parsonages. Of these states, New 
Jersey had perhaps the most interesting and convoluted experience shifting from not 
exempting parsonages to exempting them. In 1863, the state did not explicitly 
provide for the exemption of most religious property. The sole religious exemption 
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in its property tax was for “parsonages, with lots attached, not to exceed [$5000].”285 
In 1866, the state enacted legislation that superseded the prior exemptions. It 
expressly exempted “buildings erected and used for religious worship, and the land 
whereon the same are situate, necessary to the fair use and enjoyment thereof, not 
exceeding five acres for each one, the furniture thereof and the personal property 
used therein, [and] the endowment or fund of any religious society.”286  
While the 1866 law added buildings used for religious worship, it deleted 
language expressly exempting parsonages. When the First Reformed Dutch Church 
challenged the 1866 property tax assessment of a parsonage it owned, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court explained that the 1866 law superseded the 1863 law.287 According 
to the court, “if the legislature had intended to continue the exemption of parsonages, 
and to an unlimited value, it is not reasonable to believe that they would have left it 
to the mere construction that might be forced out of the word ‘endowment.’”288 
In the early 1870s, the New Jersey legislature started to exempt parsonages, not 
by general law, but by private laws. In 1873, it exempted the parsonage belonging to 
the Presbyterian congregation in Reaville and the parsonage belonging to the Reform 
Church in Middletown.289 It was not until 1903 that New Jersey reinserted in its 
property tax law an exemption for parsonages.290 The exemption was not absolute, 
though: it only exempted parsonages “owned by any religious corporation of this 
state while actually used by the officiating clergyman thereof,” and only exempted 
parsonages up to a value of $5000.291 
As late as 1960, the New Jersey legislature deliberately enacted a law only 
exempting parsonages from the property tax to the extent of $5000.292 It was not until 
1964 that New Jersey shifted from a limit on the value of exempt parsonages to a 
limit on the number of parsonages (two) and the acreage (five) of exempt parsonages 
that continues until today.293 
Other states have been less dramatic in their shifts from nonexempt to exempt, 
but they have also used legislation to make that shift. In Indiana, for instance, the 
legislature had exempted “building[s] erected for religious worship.”294 In 1871, the 
state supreme court held that, in spite of the “careful and mature consideration” it 
had given “to the very able and ingenious argument of the learned counsel for the 
appellants,” it was “unable to see how we can, by construction, extend the statute so 
as to embrace parsonages that have been erected for the convenience and 
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accommodation of the pastor of the church.”295 That power, it said, lay in the 
legislature.296 
Twenty years later, the legislature exercised that power.297 In 1891, the Indiana 
legislature exempted buildings used for religious worship and “the parsonage 
attached thereto and occupied as such” from the property tax.298  
In 1859, the Massachusetts consolidated general statutes provided for a tax on all 
real and personal property owned by state residents unless exempted by the law.299 
The law provided for a number of exemptions, including “[h]ouses of religious 
worship, and the pews and furniture.”300 Any part of exempt houses not used for 
religious worship, though, would be subject to the property tax at ordinary property 
tax rates.301  
Did parsonages fit within the scope of the exemption? Massachusetts courts held 
that they did not. Exempting parsonages would certainly “aid in the support of public 
worship . . .” but the legislature has not undertaken to exempt that which would do 
this, but the house of religious worship only.”302 Because the legislature had 
explicitly—and only—exempted those parts of houses of religious worship actually 
used for religious worship, parsonages did not qualify for the exemption. 
In 1938, the Massachusetts legislature amended its exemption. Houses of 
religious worship remained exempt to the extent they were used for religious 
worship, but the legislature added an exemption “to an amount not exceeding five 
thousand dollars for each parsonage.”303 Five years after its enactment, the courts 
affirmed a religious organization could own more than one parsonage and that the 
$5000 exemption applied to each parsonage separately.304 
In the nineteenth century, Rhode Island law also exempted property used 
exclusively for religious purposes.305 The state supreme court found that parsonages 
did not qualify for exemption under this law.306  Even using one room of the 
parsonage for religious worship did not convert the character of the parsonage into a 
building used for religious worship.307 It took until almost halfway through the 
twentieth century for Rhode Island to amend its property tax exemption to include 
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parsonages.308 And when it included parsonages, it limited the exempt value of a 
parsonage to $10,000.309 
Idaho made a similar legislative change, though the reasons for the change are 
unclear. When Idaho became a state, it “carr[ied] over the language of the territorial 
statute exempting religious property into the law of the state.”310 Similar to many 
other states, the territorial (and then state) law exempted “[c]hurches, chapels and 
other buildings with the lots or ground appurtenant thereto and used therewith, 
belonging to any church organization or society and used for religious worship.”311 
No cases explicitly adjudicate the question of whether this exemption included 
parsonages, but two things suggest that it did not. First, Idaho courts construe tax 
exemptions narrowly and strictly against the taxpayer.312 The language of the statute 
required that exempt buildings be used for religious worship. Residence is not 
worship, and other states that dealt with the question held that, where the exemption 
statute required religious worship, parsonages did not qualify. 
Second, in 1913, Idaho changed its law.313 While the impetus for the change is 
unclear, the result is perfectly clear. Under the 1913 law, the tax exemption applied 
not only to buildings owned by religious entities and used for public worship, but 
also to “any parsonage belonging to such corporation or society and occupied as 
such.”314 Whatever the legislature’s motivation in doing so, like the other states 
discussed in this Section, it explicitly legislated an exemption for parsonages.315 
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3. Judicial Change 
Two states comprise the third category, in which the exemption of parsonages 
occurred through judicial decisions rather than amendments to the state constitution 
or state statutes. Like Idaho, in 1895, Oregon’s supreme court held that tax 
exemptions were strictly construed against the taxpayer, and to claim an exemption, 
the legislature’s intent to grant it had to be “clear beyond a reasonable doubt.”316 
Although the property in front of the Oregon Supreme Court was not a parsonage, 
the court used a parsonage as an example of the type of property that would not 
qualify as exempt from taxation.317 
More than eighty years later, taxpayers seem to have internalized the court’s dicta. 
In 1976, the Skyline Assembly of God acknowledged that the portion of its property 
it used as a parsonage did not qualify for a property tax exemption.318 It argued that 
its use of the rest of its property did qualify for exemption, though, because it used 
the rest of the property for religious purposes.319  
It took until the following year for the question of whether a parsonage qualified 
for tax exemption to land squarely in front of the Oregon court.320 And when the 
question landed squarely in front of the court, it chose not to follow its previous dicta 
entirely. Instead, it held that if the property owner showed that it needed a parsonage 
to accomplish a religious purpose and that because its actual use was to accomplish 
religious purposes, a parsonage could qualify as exempt. Parsonages, under Oregon 
judicial precedent, do not automatically qualify as exempt. But, the court said, with 
appropriate needs and uses, they can.321 
Illinois presents perhaps the most complex case of all of the states whose law 
changed to allow the exemption of parsonages. The 1870 state constitution required 
that the legislature levy a tax under which “every person and corporation shall pay a 
tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property.”322 The constitution allowed, 
but did not require, the legislature to exempt from that general property tax property 
“used exclusively for . . . religious . . . purposes.”323 The legislature could only create 
these exemptions through general law.324  
Two years later, the Illinois legislature enacted legislation creating a general 
property tax that applied to, among other things, “[a]ll real and personal property in 
this state.”325 The statute took advantage of the constitutionally permitted 
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 317. Id.  
 318. Skyline Assembly of God v. Dep’t of Revenue, 545 P.2d 879, 880 (Or. 1976). 
 319. Id. 
 320. German Apostolic Christian Church v. Dep’t of Revenue, 569 P.2d 596, 599 (Or. 
1977) (“We have not in the past directly ruled on the taxability of a church rectory or 
parsonage.”). 
 321. See id. at 600. 
 322. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 1. 
 323. Id. § 3. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Act of Mar. 30, 1872, ch. 120, § 1, 1872 Ill. Laws 1620, 1624.  
2021] GOD IS MY ROOMMATE?  559 
 
exemptions, removing, among other things, “[a]ll property used exclusively for 
religious purposes” from the property tax base.326 
In 1905, the Illinois legislature amended its property tax exemptions, adding 
parsonages to the list of property exempt from the property tax.327 In 1907, the Cook 
County tax collector sued the First Congregational Church of Oak Park for unpaid 
property taxes on a two-story home owned by the church and used exclusively by the 
pastor and his family as a residence.328 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that a home used “primarily for a family 
residence by the pastor” was not used “exclusively for religious purposes,”329 the 
constitutional requirement for a property tax exemption. Moreover, in spite of its 
attempt, the court held that the legislature could not “make that a religious purpose 
which in fact is not a religious purpose.”330 Because housing clergy did not qualify 
as a religious purpose, church-owned parsonages in Illinois were subject to the 
property tax.331 
Five years later, the court revisited the question of parsonage tax exemptions. The 
pastor of the First Congregational Church of DeKalb lived with his family in a 
church-owned parsonage.332 The pastor testified that not only did he and his family 
live in the parsonage, but that he also used the parsonage for a number of religious 
purposes, including counselling congregants, performing marriages and baptisms, 
and sometimes even holding classes and Sunday school.333 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the parsonage did not qualify for an 
exemption from the property tax despite these incidental religious uses.334 Under a 
general property tax, it noted, all property is taxable unless exempted from taxation 
by the state constitution and statutes consistent with the state constitution.335 “And in 
determining whether property falls within the terms of the exemption, whether it be 
constitutional or statutory, it is the primary use to which the property is put which 
must be considered and not its secondary use.”336 
The court found that, in spite of the various incidental uses of the parsonage, its 
primary use was housing the pastor and his family.337 Housing the pastor was a 
 
 
 326. Id. § 2. 
 327. People ex rel. Thompson v. First Congregational Church of Oak Park, 83 N.E. 536, 
537 (Ill. 1907). 
 328. Id.  
 329. Id. at 538. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. First Congregational Church of De Kalb v. Bd. of Review of De Kalb Cnty., 98 N.E. 
275, 275 (Ill. 1912). 
 333. Id.  
 334. Id. at 277. 
 335. Id. at 276. 
 336. Id. (citing People ex rel. Thompson v. First Congregational Church of Oak Park, 83 
N.E. 536, 538 (Ill. 1907)). 
 337. Id. at 276–77. 
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secular, not religious, purpose.338 In 1912, then, parsonages in Illinois continued to 
be subject to the state’s general property tax.339 
In 1957, the Illinois legislature tried again to exempt parsonages from the property 
tax. It amended the Revenue Act of 1939 to exempt 
[a]ll property used exclusively for religious purposes, . . . including all 
such property owned by churches or religious institutions and used in 
conjunction therewith as parsonages or other housing facilities provided 
for ministers, their spouses, children and domestic employees, 
performing the duties of their vocation as ministers at such churches or 
religious institutions.340 
Kurt McKenzie, an Illinois taxpayer, challenged the exemption for parsonages as 
being unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution.341 His argument for its 
unconstitutionality roughly followed the Illinois Supreme Court’s early twentieth-
century cases: parsonages were used primarily for secular purposes and therefore 
were not used exclusively for religious purposes.342 
Essentially, McKenzie argued that the Illinois Constitution created a blanket ban 
of exempting parsonages because a parsonage’s “residential character must 
predominate over any other religious uses of the property.”343 The court disagreed. 
It had a long history of reading the exclusivity requirement of property tax exemption 
as requiring that a property’s primary purpose be exempt.344 Parsonages, it held, were 
no different in this regard.345 
But the court did highlight a significant difference between McKenzie’s case and 
the earlier cases denying parsonages a tax exemption. The narrow construction of 
primary religious use, it explained, “is out of step with more recent Illinois authority 
on tax exemptions, and these cases do not establish that parsonages may never be 
used exclusively—that is primarily—for religious purposes.”346 Under contemporary 
 
 
 338. Id. at 277. It is worth noting, as we explore the convoluted history of the parsonage 
property tax exemption, that the Illinois Supreme Court’s conclusion was not inevitable. 
Around the same time, South Dakota’s constitution exempted religious property with language 
identical to that found in the Illinois Constitution. State ex rel. Eveland v. Erickson, 182 N.W. 
315, 318 (S.D. 1921). The South Dakota Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the 
dissenters in First Congregational Church of De Kalb v. Board of Review of De Kalb County, 
98 N.E. 275, 278 (Ill. 1912): the exclusivity requirement meant the property was used primarily 
for religious purposes, and that housing clergy was a religious purpose. Id. at 319. Thus, with 
an identical constitution and a substantially identical fact pattern, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court allowed for the exemption of parsonages where the Illinois Supreme Court did not. 
 339. See First Congregational Church of De Kalb, 98 N.E. at 226. 
 340. Act of July 13, 1938, § 19, 1938 Ill. Laws 66 (codified as amended at Act of June 13, 
1957, sec. 1, § 19, 1957 Ill. Laws 614, 615). 
 341. McKenzie v. Johnson, 456 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ill. 1983). 
 342. Id. at 76–77. 
 343. Id. at 78. 
 344. Id.  
 345. Id. at 78–79. 
 346. Id. at 79. 
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standards, the court looks to whether the property “reasonably and substantially 
facilitates the aims of religious worship or religious instruction.”347 
The Illinois Supreme Court emphasized in its McKenzie decision that the 
inclusion of parsonages in the statute does not mean parsonages inherently qualify 
as exempt. Rather, the inclusion of parsonages in the statute illustrates “one type of 
property that, under appropriate circumstances, may qualify for the general religious 
property exemption.”348 Because the 1957 legislation did not expand the set of 
exempt religious property beyond the state constitution—and because judicial 
definitions of exclusivity expanded—by 1957, Illinois had shifted from refusing to 
exempt parsonages to accepting parsonages as exempt from the property tax under 
many circumstances.349 
V. THE WRONG HISTORY 
While a careful review of the history of property tax exemptions for parsonages 
demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit misunderstood the history, even if it had 
portrayed the history correctly that history would not lend support to the idea that 
income tax exemptions for housing allowances met the historical significance test. A 
property tax exemption differs from an income tax exclusion, both substantively and 
constitutionally. Moreover, the beneficiary of the income tax exclusion differs from 
the beneficiary of the property tax exemption. 
The Western District of Wisconsin noticed this distinction between a property and 
an income tax. The district court opinion pointed out that the history the intervenors 
relied on was the history of church property tax exemptions.350 The court stated that 
it “cannot generalize that all religious tax exemptions are permissible simply because 
one type of exemption has historical support.”351 
The district court raised a critical point. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the need to define “the precise boundary of the 
Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted.”352 
The historical significance test requires this specificity precisely because it relies on 
the Framers’ acceptance of the practice, as well as it subsequently withstanding “the 
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”353 
If the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence actually requires the specific practice, even 
if states had consistently exempted parsonages from property tax, that would not 
reflect on the constitutionality of an income tax exclusion. And, in fact, income tax 
exemptions could never pass the historical significance test, since the first time the 
 
 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 77. 
 349. See Act of July 13, 1938, § 19, 1938 Ill. Laws 66 (codified as amended at Act of June 
13, 1957, sec. 1, § 19, 1957 Ill. Laws 614, 615); McKenzie, 456 N.E.2d at 100. 
 350. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1102 (W.D. Wis. 2017), rev’d, No. 16-
CV-215-BBC, 2017 WL 6375819 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 13, 2017),  rev’d, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 
2019). 
 351. Id. at 1103. 
 352. 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014). 
 353. Id. 
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country implemented a federal income tax was during the Civil War and the second 
time was in 1913.354  
How does the Seventh Circuit deal with this problem? It denies that there is a 
problem, asserting that the difference between property tax and income tax is “too 
fine a distinction” to matter.355 And it is too fine a distinction, according to the 
Seventh Circuit, precisely because “[b]efore 1913, Congress could not 
constitutionally tax housing provided to ministers as part of their income.”356 The 
court implicitly acknowledges that the income tax, standing on its own, is not 
amenable to a historical significance test, and thus it has to import two centuries of 
property tax to force the question to fit within the historical significance test 
framework. 
This move, while necessary for the court to apply its historical significance test, 
does not work. The history, policy, and constitutional considerations surrounding 
property taxes differ too much from the same history, policy, and constitutional 
considerations that apply to the income tax.  
Critically, income taxes and property taxes are not functionally equivalent. Some 
differences reflect practical concerns. Property taxation is a subset of wealth 
taxation,357 in contrast to income taxation, which is not. Property and income taxation 
are “not the same in substance.”358 A property tax is imposed on the assessed value 
of the property, and is due whether or not the owner has liquid assets with which to 
pay the tax.359 The federal income tax, by contrast, is imposed on net income, 
ensuring taxpayers have some degree of liquidity with which to pay the tax.360 In 
essence, then, a taxpayer can owe property tax even when she has no income with 
which to pay the property tax. By definition, though, she cannot owe income tax 
unless she has income. 
Popular perception of income and property taxes reflects this difference. Because 
of the different bases of the two taxes (income versus assessed value of the property), 
they may have “different political optics.”361 And historically, the two have had 
different constitutional optics. For instance, in 1969, William Consedine, general 
counsel of the U.S. Catholic Conference, argued to the Senate that “fiscal separation” 
was fundamental to the separation of church and state.362 According to Consedine, 
 
 
 354. See supra note 11. 
 355. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 436 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 356. Id. 
 357. Joseph Bankman & Daniel Shaviro, Piketty in America: A Tale of Two Literatures, 
68 TAX L. REV. 453, 489 (2015) (“A conventional wealth tax would be a property tax—albeit, 
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 358. Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment 
Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 932 (2009). 
 359. See Stewart E. Sterk & Mitchell L. Engler, Property Tax Reassessment: Who Needs 
It?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1045 (2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Once and Future 
Property Tax: A Dialogue with My Younger Self, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2199, 2201–02 (2002). 
 360. See David A. Weisbach, The (Non)taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1, 36 (2004) 
(“Income tax advocates would prefer a Haig-Simons system but because of liquidity, 
valuation, or other problems, we have a realization system.”). 
 361. Bankman et al., supra note 357, at 488. 
 362. BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., TAX REFORM—1969: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1969 (PUBLIC LAW 91-172) WITH RELATED AMENDMENTS 4435 (1991). 
2021] GOD IS MY ROOMMATE?  563 
 
that fiscal separation did not mean that religion was exempt from tax. In fact, 
“[w]here the tax is imposed on property and not directly on religious activities, 
Government has wide discretion under our Constitution to impose or not to impose 
the tax.”363 
These different constitutional optics may reflect actual constitutional differences. 
While the courts recognize property taxes as direct taxes subject to constitutionally 
mandated apportionment,364 the Sixteenth Amendment expressly permits Congress 
to impose income taxes without apportioning them.365 Moreover, an emerging 
(though not universal) consensus believes that the Supreme Court overreached in its 
Pollock decision, which found the income tax unconstitutional.366 If this consensus 
is right, the Sixteenth Amendment was superfluous because, unlike taxes on real 
property, taxes on income do not fall within the scope of direct taxes. 
Given these structural and constitutional differences, there is no plausible 
justification for the Seventh Circuit’s assertion that differences between income and 
property taxes were “too fine” to have constitutional relevance.367 Even assuming 
that there were justifications for using the history of property tax exemptions to 
explore the constitutionality of an income tax exclusion, though, state property tax 
exemptions for religiously owned property provide no information about what the 
Framers thought of the permissibility of these exemptions. 
The court was correct that the Framers could not have considered the 
constitutionality of exempting ministers from an income tax on housing allowances 
when they wrote the Constitution, because the United States would not enact a 
federal income tax for nearly seventy-five years after they enacted the Constitution. 
But they were also not thinking about the constitutionality of exempting church 
property from a property tax. In fact, they most likely did not consider the contours 
of a property tax at all. 
The Constitution gave Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises.”368 It limited that power, though, with respect to direct taxes. 
Under the Constitution, “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”369 This 
apportionment of direct taxes, along with determining representation in the House, 
was part of the Three-Fifths Compromise that inserted inequality directly into the 
Constitution and bridged a divide between northern and southern states.370 
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 364. See supra notes 358–62 and accompanying text. 
 365. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 366. Johnsen et al., supra note 129, at 114, 119 (“Furthermore, most (but not all) 
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 367. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 436 (7th Cir. 2019). 
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The problem with this bridge was that nobody knew precisely what constituted a 
direct tax.371 Whatever the scope of a direct tax was, though, there was broad 
consensus that it included taxes on real property. Alexander Hamilton believed that 
indirect taxes were made up largely of “duties and excises on articles of 
consumption,” while direct taxes included taxes on real property.372 And in 1796, a 
majority of the Supreme Court wrote in their opinions in Hylton that direct taxes 
included taxes on land.373  
Effectively, requiring Congress to apportion direct taxes meant that Congress 
would generally not impose direct taxes. Apportioning a tax on real property would 
require each state to pay the percentage of the tax that corresponded to the percentage 
of the country’s population that lived in the state. More populous states would face 
a higher tax burden, irrespective of the value of the land in the state.374  
The apportionment requirement did not make a federal property tax impossible. It 
did ensure its unlikeliness, though. The Framers expected that Congress would enact 
direct taxes rarely, if at all.375 In fact, the federal government only enacted direct 
taxes four times: “once in 1798, twice during the War of 1812, and once during the 
Civil War.”376  
In crafting these federal property taxes, the federal government had to comply 
with the Establishment Clause.377 For the first 150 years of the Constitution, though, 
the courts gave virtually no guidance as to what such compliance looked like.378 
Similarly, these federal property taxes provide no information about the Framers’ 
thoughts on exemptions for religiously owned property generally, or for parsonages 
in particular. Each of the statutes provides for a direct tax on, among other things, all 
lands, dwelling-houses, and enslaved persons located within a state.379 These direct 
taxes provided exemptions for property owned by the United States, by the states, 
and for property exempted under the law of the respective state.380 States, in turn, 
had not yet implemented universal property taxes. As a result, their property tax 
exemptions were ad hoc and largely carried over from their colonial history.381  
371. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1999)
(“Within this context, the fact that the nature of ‘direct’ taxation was lost in a haze of 
uncertainty was not a vice—it helped the contending parties to patch together a verbally 
attractive compromise, and to turn their attention to more profitable subjects of 
conversation.”). 
372. THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
373. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175–76, 183 (1796).
374. Cf. Samuel D. Brunson, Paying for Gun Violence, 104 MINN. L. REV. 605, 628 (2019)
(describing hypothetical example of an unfair apportioned direct tax). 
375. EINHORN, supra note 370, at 165.
376. Id. at 158.
377. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The
Establishment Clause originally protected States, and by extension their citizens, from the 
imposition of an established religion by the Federal Government.”). 
378. BRUNSON, supra note 23, at 14.
379. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, § 2, 1 Stat. 597, 598; Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 16, § 5, 3
Stat. 22, 26; Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, § 5, 3 Stat. 164, 166; Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 
§ 13, 12 Stat. 292, 297.
380. § 2, 1 Stat. at 598; § 5, 3 Stat. at 26; § 5, 3 Stat. at 166; § 13, 12 Stat. at 297.
381. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
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If federal property tax does nothing to help us understand how the Framers viewed 
the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for parsonages, looking at state-level 
property tax exemptions does little more. In the first instance, the Establishment 
Clause applied only to the federal government, and created no impediment to states 
favoring religion if they so chose.382 In the second, state legislatures did not initially 
approach property taxes systemically.383 When they finally did, they evinced 
significant skepticism about exemptions from the property tax, and even when 
legislatures permitted exemptions for religious property, they crafted those 
exemptions narrowly, often in ways that excluded parsonages.384  
Finally, and most importantly, even if the history of federal or state property tax 
exemptions provided any insight into the Framers’ views—as the historical 
significance test mandates385—that history proves utterly irrelevant to the question 
the Seventh Circuit addressed. The question before the court was not about the 
constitutionality of providing tax-free housing to clergy. While the taxpayers 
originally challenged the constitutionality of this in kind allowance, the district court 
dismissed that portion of the challenge, and the taxpayers did not appeal its 
dismissal.386 The only question in front of the court was whether the Constitution 
allowed the government to exclude cash housing allowances paid to clergy from the 
clergy’s income.387  
Naturally, clergy did not—and do not—pay property tax on their income. Neither 
do other taxpayers. By definition, a property tax does not apply to taxpayers’ 
income—its base is the assessed value of the taxpayers’ property, not their income.388 
As a result, state property tax laws could not reach housing allowances. 
Moreover, even if a court were to stretch analogy beyond the breaking point, 
property tax exemptions provide no support for excluding cash allowances that allow 
clergy to rent or buy their own homes. In every state that permits an explicit 
exemption for parsonages, the law requires that the parsonage be owned by a 
religious organization, not by individual clergy.389 Similarly, in other states without 
an explicit exemption for parsonages, only religiously owned property can qualify 
for the exemption.390  
382. See supra notes 135 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
386. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 425 (7th Cir. 2019).
387. See id. at 424–25 (“In response, Gaylor and Barker filed amended tax returns for 2012
and 2013 claiming refunds for their housing allowances under § 107(2); Nicol Gaylor did the 
same for 2013.”). 
388. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 498 (2017)
(“[T]he local property tax base . . . is determined by the assessed value of homes in the 
community.”). 
389. See supra Section IV.A.1.
390. See supra Section IV.A.2–3. New York State provides the one exception to this rule;
in New York, clergy can exclude up to $1500 of property annually from the property tax. N.Y. 
REAL PROP. TAX § 460(1) (McKinney 2017). Even this exception to the general rule provides 
no support for the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance—the exemption, whether or 
not constitutional, is both insufficient to substantively cover housing costs and it applies 
broadly to all taxable property, irrespective of type or use. 
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Ultimately, then, even if the history of state property tax exemptions for 
parsonages provided a clean and consistent history, that history would have nothing 
to say about whether an income tax exclusion for housing allowances paid to clergy 
comported with the Establishment Clause. Income taxes and property taxes differ 
substantively and constitutionally. Beyond that difference, because the 
Establishment Clause did not apply to states, their property taxes and exemptions did 
not have to comply with constitutional limitations on the establishment of religion. 
And on those rare occasions when the federal government looked to direct taxation, 
it ignored questions of religious property altogether, instead adopting whatever 
exemptions the various states recognized. 
CONCLUSION 
An in-depth look at the history of state property tax exemptions for parsonages is 
illuminating. It demonstrates shifts in state policy underlying both property taxes and 
exemptions from property tax. This history shows that exempting parsonages is not 
an inevitable policy choice, and even when a state exempts parsonages, the state often 
imposes limits on that exemption. Those limits range from all states limiting the 
exemption to parsonages owned by religious organizations to some states limiting 
the acreage, value, or number of exempt parsonages. 
This historical analysis does not illuminate that the parsonage allowance is 
consonant with the Establishment Clause. Admittedly, the history also does not show 
that the parsonage allowance violates the Establishment Clause. However, the federal 
government has rarely enacted property taxes, and the Establishment Clause was 
incorporated against the states relatively recently. As a result, the question of 
establishment was not one that states generally grappled with. Instead, the 
constitutional question many states had to deal with was whether parsonages met the 
state constitution’s requirement for a religious tax exemption, which often turned on 
whether housing clergy qualified as a religious purpose. This is an important 
question, but one with no relevance to whether the federal exclusion of housing 
allowances to clergy violates the Establishment Clause. 
Even if the history of property tax exemptions provided a clear case for or against 
the constitutionality of the federal parsonage allowance, though, this Article 
demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit’s use of that history in Gaylor was deeply 
deficient. The Seventh Circuit asserted—inaccurately—an unbroken, consistent 
history of exemptions for religious property and used that history to assume a 
similarly unbroken history of exemptions for parsonages.  
The consistent history the Seventh Circuit asserted is entirely imaginary. The 
policy for exempting religious property from the property tax has shifted 
substantially over the last two centuries and was controversial even in its earliest 
days. In fact, both California and the District of Columbia had periods during the 
nineteenth century when they did not exempt religious property. 
And history demonstrates that the exemption for religious property has always 
been narrower than all property owned by a religious organization. All states have 
required that exempt property be owned by the religious organization, and most 
states have required that it either be used for religious purposes (or, in some cases, 
worship) or otherwise be explicitly listed to qualify for an exemption from the 
property tax. 
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The Seventh Circuit elided all of this complexity and inconsistency in the one 
page of its opinion it dedicated to evaluating the history of property tax exemptions 
for parsonages.391 Instead, it posited a clean, orderly, consistent history, with “a 
lengthy tradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for church-owned 
properties.”392 While the purported history the Gaylor court relied on was clean and 
easy to understand, this Article has demonstrated both that there is no singular 
lengthy tradition of tax exemptions for religion, and that even if there were, “church-
owned properties” is far too broad a category. Moreover, its opinion entirely missed 
the fragility of property tax exemptions for parsonages. 
The problem here is not merely a deficient Seventh Circuit opinion, though that 
is a problem. In general, this Article should give pause to the idea that a historical 
significance test is a viable test for Establishment Clause questions. A historical 
argument is not a legal argument, and there is no reason to believe that attorneys or 
judges have the skills necessary to make or adjudicate a historical argument well.393 
Gathering and reviewing the history of a law that may privilege religion is a long and 
complicated undertaking. It is both interesting and important but may be an 
undertaking better left to the academy than to judicial proceedings. If courts truly 
want to use a historical significance test, they need to engage fully with the history, 
not use a subset of the history as a justification to arrive at the result they want. 
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess. But adding 
a poorly conceived and poorly done historical analysis to the mix of jurisprudential 
tools does little to clarify and improve the Establishment Clause landscape. As the 
Seventh Circuit’s Gaylor opinion and this Article demonstrate, unless courts are 
willing to put in an inordinate amount of work and analysis, they should avoid the 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1: STATES WITH EXPRESS STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FOR PARSONAGES  
State Statutory Exemption 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 29.45.030(b) (2018) 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-3-206 (2020) 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-81(15) (West 2019)  
District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1002(15) (2015)  
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.011(b)(3) (West 2014)  
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-41(a)(3) (2017) 
Hawaii 
COUNTY OF MAUI, HAW., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§3.48.495(B)(3) (1980); 
COUNTY OF HAW., HAW., CODE  
§ 19-77(b)(3) (2016, as amended); 
COUNTY OF HONOLULU, HAW., REV. ORDINANCES 
§ 8-10.10(b)(3) (1990); 
COUNTY OF KAUAʻI, HAW., CODE tit. III, 
§ 5A-11.10(b)(3) (1987). 
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-602B (West 2017) 
Illinois 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/15-40(b) (2016) 
Indiana IND. CODE § 6-1.1-10-21(b), (c) (West 2013) 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201 (West 2018) 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. tit. 36, § 652(1)(G) (2010) 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., TAX–PROP. § 7-204(2) (LexisNexis 2018) 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 5 (West 2010) 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.7s (West 2010) 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-31-1(d) (West 2012) 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-6-201(1)(b) (2019) 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361.125(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2016) 
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. § 72:23(III) (2012) 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 2017) 
New York N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 462 (McKinney 2017) 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-278.3(d)(1) (West 2018) 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 57-02-08(9)(a) (2018) 
Rhode Island 44 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-3-3(a)(6) (2010) 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220(A)(3) (Supp. 2019) 
Texas TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20 (West 2015) 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3832(2) (Supp. 2019) 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3606(A)(2) (2017) 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.36.020(2)(a) (West 2018) 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-3-9(a)(6) (LexisNexis 2020) 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 70.11(4) (West 2016) 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-11-105(a)(vii)(A) (2019) 
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APPENDIX 2: NON-STATUTORILY-RECOGNIZED EXEMPTION FOR PARSONAGES  
State General Religious Exemption Judicial Application to Parsonages 
Delaware Del. Code. Ann.  tit. 9, § 8105 (2011) 
St. Stanislaus Kostka Church  
v. Mayor of Wilmington,  
105 A.2d 596, 599 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954),  
aff'd sub nom.  
Mayor of Wilmington  
v. St. Stanislaus Kostka Church,  
108 A.2d 581 (1954) 
Iowa 
Iowa Code Ann. 
§ 427.1(8)(a) 
(West 2020) 
Trinity Lutheran Church of Des Moines  
v. Browner,  
255 Iowa 197, 200–01 (1963) 
Louisiana La. Const.,  art. VII, § 21(B)(1)(a)(i)  
Minnesota 
Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 272.02 subd. 6  
(West 2017) 
In re Collection of Delinquent Real Prop. 
Taxes,  
530 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Minn. 1995) 
Missouri Mo. Const.  art. X, § 6(1) 
Bishop's Residence Co. v. Hudson,  
4 S.W. 435, 435 (1887) 
Nebraska 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 77-202(1)(d)  
(LexisNexis 2017) 
Neb. Ann. Conf. of United Methodist Church  
v. Scotts Bluff Cty. Bd. of Equalization,  
499 N.W.2d 543, 548 (1993) 
New 
Mexico 
N.M. Const.  
art. VIII, § 3 
N.M. Admin. Code 3.6.5.15(L)(2)  
(as amended in 2001) 
Oklahoma Okla. Const.  art. X, § 6 
Immanuel Baptist Church v. Glass,  
497 P.2d 757, 760 (Okla. 1972)  
South 
Dakota 
S.D. Codified Laws  
§ 10-4-9 (Supp. 2020) 
State v. Erickson,  
182 N.W. 315, 319 (S.D. 1921) 
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APPENDIX 3: PARSONAGE EXEMPTION DEPENDS ON USE   
State General Religious Exemption 
Conditions for Application to 
Parsonages 
California 
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 
§ 214(a)  
(West 2011) 
First United Methodist Church of Santa 
Monica  
v. Los Angeles Cnty.,  
161 Cal. App. 3d 1091, 208 Cal. Rptr. 85, 
93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 307.140(1) (2017) 
Washington Cnty. Assessor  
v. W. Beaverton Congregation of 
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc.,  
18 Or. Tax 409, 417–18 (2006) 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-212(a)(1) (2018) 
Blackwood Bros. Evangelistic Ass’n  
v. State Bd. of Equalization,  
614 S.W.2d 364, 366  
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) 
 APPENDIX 4: NO PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR PARSONAGES  
State General Religious Exemption Denial of Application to Parsonages 
Ohio 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 5709.07(A)(2)–(3) 
(LexisNexis 2019) 
Grace Cathedral, Inc. v. Testa,  
36 N.E.3d 136, 141 (Ohio 2015) 
Pennsylvania 
72 PA. STAT. ANN.  
§ 5020-204(a)(1)  
(West 2013) 
Connellsville Street Church of Christ  
v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals,  
838 A.2d 848, 853 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) 
Utah UTAH CONST.  art. XIII, § 3(1)(f) 
Salt Lake Cty. v. Tax Comm’n  
ex rel. Good Shepherd Lutheran Church,  
548 P.2d 630, 631 (Utah 1976) 
 APPENDIX 5: NO JUDICIAL GUIDANCE ON TREATMENT OF PARSONAGES  
State General Religious Property Tax Exemption 
Alabama ALA. CODE  § 40-9-1(1)(LexisNexis 2011) 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 42-11109(A) (2018) 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 39-3-106 (West 2019) 
Kentucky KY. CONST. § 170 
